Could the ENA carry the burden of negotiating peace?

Eritreans and the international community now know the official response of the regime in Asmara to Ethiopia’s November 25, 2004 peace initiative. Through a press release distributed by the Foreign Ministry, the dictator had dismissed the five-point proposal as empty and useless. This came as no surprise to all who know the irrational and erratic character of the dictator because it was widely anticipated. As dictators in similar circumstances do, he is very much aware that his survival largely depends on constant state of tension and insecurity that feed on hyped up chauvinistic sentiments, which, in the case of Eritrea, is anchored in the exaggerated pretension of defending sovereignty - a bandwagon that also allows space for some isolationists to jump on though a few did rush to snatch the chance and jump off to applaud the new Ethiopian move.

Clearly, the offer of dialogue by the Ethiopian side to start the demarcation process was received with relief by all who have stake in lasting peace and normalization of relations, especially the two peoples involved knowing they will have much to gain from peace and stability as requisites for mutually beneficial co-operation and development. Not less significantly, moreover, members of the international community have unequivocally welcomed the five-point proposal, which clearly indicates an interest in reducing tension and avoiding any possibility for renewed hostilities. There is conscious realization that the senseless border war over a border dispute (!), and the long conflict before it, have ravaged the two countries and caused terrible human miseries. Aid fatigue and flare up of new crises elsewhere around the world pressed donor governments and organizations to call for an early end to the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea through dialogue so that the meager resources of those impoverished nations would be spared for fighting poverty and diseases.

This rationale appears to have been consciously grasped by the leadership in Ethiopia within the context of a strategy for winning the conflict while at the same time never losing focus on the immediate benefits that could be accrued from close working relationship with the international community by offering serious accommodation of its concerns. Useful interaction with governments that possess the power to pull the strings of the dominating international order requires broad understanding and sensing the impulses that drive international relations. Competence in executing national tasks would allow a good prospect for judiciously listing national priorities with basic needs of a nation in clear sight. In times of war and peace, possession of knowledge and foresight are key requirements for statesmanship.

That is one of the clear lessons that one could gather from comparison of the way the Ethio-Eritrean conflict was being managed from the two capitals. Having won the war militarily, the Ethiopian leadership quickly prepared and focused on winning the peace through the craft of diplomacy. The first step for success in that battle begins by pragmatic interaction with international bodies and powers that count. As the giant of the Horn region (in terms of resources and population), the leadership in Ethiopia expected engaging in the diplomatic battle to be much easier considering the incompetent and isolationist nature of its adversaries in Asmara.

In contrast, the dictator remains bogged down in his obsession with power relying on his regime’s only expertise of stirring tension and conflicts here and there. This has been continuing since the post liberation euphoria began to wane, and people began to ask questions about his behavior and the way the dictator conducted the affairs of the fledgling nation. This time too, even after causing the nation to lose so much due to military debacles and diplomatic fiascoes, he has not changed a bit. His negative response to the Ethiopian peace initiative proves his arrogant moodiness and unpredictability. Near unanimous Eritrean and international support for the initiative did not matter to him because peace would not count in his favor for it would bring an end to the insecurity and tension he depends on to sustain his grip on power. The dictator is inherently antipathetic to normality, and believes that any let up in repression and control would lead to respite in the country and constitute menace to his autocratic rule.

All considered, thus, the regime’s rejection of Ethiopia’s offer for peace means continuation of the present state of war. But this condition is negated by the mood in favor of peace, which is now strongly reinforced by the supportive position of the international community. Only some fringe forces on both sides expressed dissent from the general trend. Thus, neither the peoples in both countries, nor the international community would condone the current status quo indefinitely.

Essentially, peace and stability involve the concern of peoples rather than governments; these may come and go. Hence, the party refusing to make peace through dialogue as a mechanism within the EEBC ruling, which, in point of fact, enjoys the support of the international community, would hardly be tolerated. Under the circumstances, it could not be long before the regime in Eritrea would qualify as rogue state. Its persistent de-stabilizing role in the region, apart from condemnation as habitual violator of human rights, would make its removal more needed than wished. The beginning of an end in such a process could become the refusal of the international community to allow the human and material resources currently being expended to police the frontier line in the conflict to maintain the status quo behind which the regime has been hiding.

Given the arrogant intransigence of the regime, the pressing desire and demand of the people for peace, and the consistent calculated cooperation of the Ethiopians with the international community would further isolate the dictatorship, and would be goaded to commit more offenses to preserve itself. This would, sooner than later, shift the paradigm in the peace making and justify an internationally and regionally sanctioned option for regime change. The resultant condition would, thereby, reinforce the role of the Eritrean opposition.

Under such circumstances, carrying the burden of negotiating peace could fall on the ENA being the only umbrella representing the majority of the organized opposition forces, and recognized by regional powers as the collective voice. But to be accepted beyond the region, it will have to transform and empower it self by eroding the external dimension of national authority which the regime has been enjoying, and be in position to claim “ the unclaimed cause” of negotiating peace, as one commentator, Gereslase Welenkiel, has recently observed [“Diplomatic Scoreboard”, Awate.com, 7 December 2004].

Competence to claim authority in its external dimension is, in point of fact, do-able task since the regime has never been legally invested with the consensually established sovereign power of the people resting in legitimate institutions of a democratic system. The only rationale for its authority since 1991 was “revolutionary legality”. This never meant to be exercised in perpetuity. Its duration was to be provisional and limited to consummation of the succession period covering the power vacuum left by the Ethiopians and transition to an elected national government.

The government that was supposed to supplant Ethiopian rule was hoped to function under a mandate granted by a constitution embodying duly expressed sovereign will of the people as vested in legitimate organs of a democratic system. The EPLF blocked the way through deception and control denying the people from asserting their internal sovereignty. Instead, it rode the euphoric mood which the liberation aroused and put up the tools of a ruthless dictatorship. The referendum of 1993 and recognition thereafter freed its hand to exercise unchallenged authority within the nation’s territorial boundaries. Actually, the core essence of the ongoing struggle is to win back the authority of the people. The role of the opposition forces is to articulate and lead the consummation of the process. With the dictatorship rejecting peace and forfeiting international and regional legitimacy, the field could be wide open to the ENA to respond to the need of the time.

Hence, the trend of events developing in the region appears to have put the ENA at crossroads. As compelling as the conditions seem to be, the Alliance should be aware of the circumstances facing it. This ought to impel it to make decisions that could profoundly impact it in positive or negative way in relation to perception the Ethiopian peace initiative would generate among the international community vis-à-vis the current diplomatic stalemate between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Already the ENA has been facing testing challenges from within and without, especially since last August when five organizations declared an intention to unite.

Up to now, the ENA leadership did not succeed to bring the Alliance to the stage where it could exercise dynamic role as actor in the opposition-versus-regime equation, despite the favorable regional condition, which the dictatorship helped to create against its own self since the mid-90s. The reasons for its failure have to do with subjective as well as objective matters that are so familiar to need more elaboration because much was already said and written by both friends and foes. Its leaders have even candidly spoken about the Alliance’s deficiencies. The question now is: can member organizations raise themselves to a realistic level and respond to the challenges, and, thereby, surprise skeptics and ill wishers alike?

This is the crucial question awaiting an answer at the shortly anticipated 7^th ordinary session of the Alliance. The ENA will have either to redefine itself, or risk anachronism and eventual oblivion. To avoid the latter, it needs to reconstitute itself in form and mission, and devise modes to drastically upgrade its organizational and functional operation compatible with a body entrusted with national purpose. The relation of member organizations and the management team needs to be clarified in context of the Charter. The fact that the ENA is a broad united front whose function is circumscribed by the task of removing the regime and drawing a smooth transition to a democratic system should not be missed.

Member organizations have their own partisan programs that they aspire to put to voters in future. Their presence in the Alliance is that each of them to add proportionate share of resource(s) to that of other partners for use to get rid of the dictatorship and prepare condition for democratic order allowing free propagation of party platforms. The tendency so far has been an attempt by some to use the Alliance as means of self-promotion or source of material benefit. In other words, the ENA remained a little world of equals without due consideration of size or contribution.

Thus, the next Alliance meeting should tackle those deficiencies that bedeviled it since its formation in 1999, and create fair condition for its expected role on national and international levels to engage in the peace making process as authentic successor of the regime. The right step in that direction would be the ENA to put in serious and concerted effort in close coordination with others to hold a national conference on the basis of reasonable consensus that accommodates all forces that have unambiguous stake in fundamental change in Eritrea.

As already mentioned, the ENA has had no discernible impact on the political and diplomatic aspects of border conflict, apart from a clear position on peaceful approach to end it. It has been maintaining hands off posture under the rationale that dealing with the issue involved a sovereign government in Asmara, which, for good or bad, represented the people. As paradoxical as the argument may sound, there is no way to justify the logic in that view since the regime has been ruling by usurping the rights of the people to assert their internal sovereignty. In fact, the Alliance was in essence formed to correct this anomaly. Had it not been the victim of its own deficiencies, the Alliance would probably have had good chance of assuming a partnership role in negotiating peace by penetrating the hurdle of external recognition of the regime under the conditions that the de-stabilizing behavior of the regime provided, as the Awate Team editorial of 26 November 2004 seemed to imply.

Consistent with its position, the ENA was among the first to welcome Ethiopia’s peace initiative. Its Secretary General encouraged member organizations to follow suite, which many did either jointly or individually. Moreover, governments in the region and beyond, and the major regional and international organizations as the UN, EU and AU have received the proposal with marked optimism about the opening that the Ethiopian initiative has offered. Uniformity of positions the proposal attracted, as opposed to the rejectionist attitude of the strongman in Asmara, suggested probabilities of the direction events may turn, especially when read in the context of the views Meles Zenawi is reported to have expressed in his briefing with the Eritrean opposition forces [Gulf Information Center, 4 December 2004]. Apart from what the Prime Minister’s open meeting with the opposition implied politically, his reported remarks about reaching peace with the Eritrean people as a strategic option (emphasis added), besides ruling out force to settle the border issue, could not be dismissed as mere diplomatic niceties. The fact that his views corresponded with the ENA position signify the role the ENA is expected to play in politics of the region vis-à-vis diplomatic solution of the conflict as desirable prelude to peace and cooperation between the peoples of the two nations.

Developments that could arise due to the regime’s rejection of peace could necessitate new peace coalition backed by the international community, and predicated on empowerment of the ENA to represent the Eritrean end of the equation as an umbrella of the majority of opposition forces; the regime as a rogue state could then become irrelevant. Thus, could such likely prospect goad the ENA to acquire the potency and credibility required at the internal and international levels and equips itself to carry the burden of negotiating peace on behalf of the Eritrean people? To find out, all eyes and ears will turn towards the venue of the 7^th session.

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