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Mandate
The debates
that are occupying our fellow Eritreans in Diaspora in general, and our
opposition parties in particular, raise a number of concerns regarding
our bearing on the burning issues today, consistency in our positions,
unpredictable precedence for the future democratic Eritrea, and many
other issues.
I am not a
party to the negotiations taking place in Khartoum. The issues I raise
in this article are probably being discussed, and if not I would like to
take this opportunity to add my own perspective on the debates taking
place in the opposition camp. The main purpose of this article, as are
my other articles, remains to continue the public debates in order to
understand and learn from each other the challenges facing Eritrea today
and for years to come.
I find the
views and position expounded by some of my fellow writers on the
Internet and some of our aspiring politicians in Diaspora to be
inconsistent with our common belief of building a democratic Eritrea.
Some may
argue that the opposition camp should concentrate on launching and
focusing its criticism at the regime rather than spreading around the
criticisms to include the opposition camp. In my view, the regime is
doing a tremendous job of shooting itself and no one, except extremely
few, needs convincing that the regime needs to be removed. As for the
opposition camp that is aspiring to play critical role in the current
struggle to remove the regime and, even more importantly, in post-PFDJ
Eritrea, it must build the right momentum and perception today that will
carry it into tomorrow’s Eritrea. The opposition camp needs and should
encourage feedback from the public to synchronize its views today
because the task of rehabilitating and building a nation does not
afford the luxury of time.
Issues
of the Nature of Opposition Political Parties in Diaspora
My first
confusion revolves around what the nature of the opposition political
parties in Diaspora is. During the struggle for liberation, the
liberation movements were referred to as ‘Front’ or ‘Movement’ to
suggest that each movement contained within it various ideas and
convictions regarding the future of Eritrea, but that during the
struggle for independence these ideas and convictions were put aside for
one aim of only – struggle for independence.
In contrast,
‘party’ largely refers to association of (like-minded) members with
specific position on a full range of very specific issues and policies.
Next come the
questions,
1.
If any of the opposition groupings consider themselves as
‘political parties’ then,
Should an opposition ‘political party’ tie-in [link] its specific
political agendas and issues with the general, basic, commonly
accepted, and underlying issues of building democratic institutions in
Eritrea?
i.
If yes [ties in], the implication is that a political
party will accept working towards building democratic institutions and
abide by its democratic principles only if the other ‘parties’ accept
its specific agendas.
ii.
If no [no tie in], the implication is that a political
party must work towards building democratic institutions as the bigger
and more critical issue, and put aside specific issues for another day
until democratic institutions begin to take shape.
iii.
The third answer might be, why can’t a ‘party’
advocate for its own issues and the common issues at the same time.
The problem of this ‘want all’ stance is that as there are many
‘parties’ that have common stance on the need for ‘democratic
institutions’ but different stance on specific issues. When these
different ‘parties’ meet and negotiate various issues, the issue that
gets sacrificed is the common stance or the debate on ‘how to build
democratic institutions’. In the end, the debate on ‘how to build
democratic institutions’ is taken for granted and put in the back burner
to the detriment of the most critical issue.
2.
If any opposition grouping consider itself as a ‘Front’ and/or
‘Movement’ for the benefit of all Eritreans then,
a.
The ‘Front’ or ‘Movement’ cannot commit itself to any specific
issues other than advocating for broad principles of democracy, freedom,
and basic rights,
b.
The ‘Front’s’ or ‘Movement’s’ mission, or raison d’etre, will be
for one specific purpose, which is to remove the regime and thus
creating the initial conducive conditions for building democratic
institution.
c.
The ‘Front’ or ‘Movement’ cannot form ‘unity’ with any ‘party’
that advocates for specific issue, but can only form ‘unity’ with other
‘Fronts’ or ‘Movements’.
Issues
of Principle & Precedence
Recently
certain opposition parties have expressed their views that they will not
compromise on their principles. In response, some writers have
criticized these parties for raising the issue of principles because all
the other parties also have their own principles. These writers argue
that no individual ‘party’ has exclusive ownership of ‘principles’. In
my view, this is not a correct view.
Principle of Non-Violence
If ‘unity’ is achieved between one party that advocates for non-violence
as a means of struggling to remove the regime and another party that
advocates for violence, the former has relinquished its principle of
non-violence.
Principle of Sovereignty
If ‘unity’ is achieved between one party that advocates for internal
resistance as a means of struggling to remove the regime and another
party that advocates for external assistance, the former has
relinquished its principle of sovereignty.
Naturally,
the party that will express its intention of maintaining its principles
is the one that is directly or indirectly asked or forced into
relinquishing it.
There is
also the danger of creating precedence. In our current situation,
as well as in the future, there will be continued call for ‘unity’. If
‘unity’ continues to be achieved by including groups that increasing
become radicalized, a dangerous precedence is created by
the eventual radicalization of ‘principles’ too.
Issues
of Mandate
The question
is how does ‘an opposition party in Diaspora’ receive its mandate.
1.
Does it receive its mandate from its members? If so, how does a
mandate from its members be projected or extrapolated to mandate of all
Eritreans given to that party?
2.
Does one party purporting to belong to one certain ethnic or
religious group claim to represent the aspirations and views of that
certain ethnic or religious group on the virtue of belonging to that
group?
It is
critical that fellow Eritreans are able to distinguish between what
individuals and/or parties project to be their mandates
against who has the basic rights to give mandate on national issues.
More often than not, there is a big gaping hole. Without explicit and
democratic process, no individual nor ‘political group’ can truly claim
to have received a mandate from the Eritrean public. A political group
or party without mandates is at best an advocacy group – nothing more.
Strictly speaking, political parties are created through laws and rules
of the country and based on the Constitution and relevant laws.
Even in the
future, there will be a real danger that even those democratically
elected representatives of the people may overstep their mandate. Being
elected does not give a representative a blank check to propagate
un-mandated views and stands once elected. The representative is the
servant or a reflection of its constituent, not its boss.
In fact, the
advent of technology may diminish the powers of representatives (or
‘Members of Parliament’). In the old days, logistical reasons required
that constituents give the most power of decision to their elected
representatives. In the near future, it may not be necessary for
representatives to cast their votes on issues in the House or Senate,
and instead high-tech will allow constituents to cast their votes on any
issues directly online. This is empowerment.
Mandate, Legality & Unity Negotiations
My next
questions are extensions of the points of I have discussed above. These
questions relate to the period of the current struggle.
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If one
party advocates for very basic and broad principles, and another party
advocates for very specific political agendas, how does one reconcile
the two positions to form a unity?
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If the
party advocating for very basic and broad principles does not believe
it has a mandate to take a stand on specific issues, would this party
be able to form genuine alliance with a party that advocates for
specific political agendas? Would not the party advocating for very
basic and broad principles violate its own ‘party’ mandate and take on
mandates not explicitly given to it by the Eritrean public?
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Enforceability – even if opposition political parties in Diaspora
somehow manage to reluctantly accept each other’s political agendas,
does it necessarily mean that it will be valid and enforceable in free
and democratic Eritrea when elections take place? What will ensure
that these ‘unity’ members remain committed to each other and
implement their agreements in post-PFDJ Eritrea? Or, even if they do
remain committed to each other, does it imply that there are tacit
agreements to bypass the Eritrean public and implement or sock it to
the unsuspecting public. If it is the Eritrean general public that
will freely debate and decide on how to deal and dispose of any
issues, the political maneuverings in Diaspora politics is academic at
best. The current political wrangling in the opposition camp can then
only be regarded as taking away from our energy and resolve to remove
the regime, and without adding much value to debates in the future
free and democratic Eritrea.
My next
confusion revolves around the following questions,
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Can the
issue of official languages, ethnical, religious laws, political
parties, land, centralized or decentralized government be discussed
and decided upon without addressing a whole range of other economic,
social, political, and legal issues. Can one party just say we
advocate, for example, for specific ‘official language’ without
addressing a whole range of other associated challenges and issues.
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Can’t one
say that entertaining some of these basic issues and political
platforms are tantamount to attempting to draft or re-draft Eritrea’s
Constitution? If the ‘unity’ negotiation is tantamount to drafting or
re-drafting Eritrea’s Constitution, do these parties have the mandate
to do so?
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Even if
these ‘unity’ members draft their own hidden Constitution, it would be
illegal if the next transitional ‘unity’ government or transitional
national assembly promulgates or imposes it without the public’s
blessing.
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This brings
me to my next question, who will make up the transitional national
assembly? It is probably suffice to say that it should be represented
by a whole range of the Eritrean population, of which most members of
the Eritrean transitional national assembly will be made up from those
Eritreans in Eritrea. These members are not party to the
negotiations taking place in Diaspora. What will force the majority
of members of the transitional government/assembly elected from within
Eritrea to abide by the terms agreed on by the opposition camp in
Diaspora? Does the fact that those in Diaspora forcefully attempt to
negotiate and incorporate wide range of issues into the opposition
agenda imply that they are attempting to bypass the transitional
national assembly, and more importantly the general public? What
assurance is there that those opposition parties in Diaspora
participating in ‘unity’ will not breakaway and join forces with other
‘local’ members in the transitional national assembly that may oppose
some or all of the issues agreed upon in Diaspora?
Possible Relevant and Timely Issues in the Opposition Camp
What are the
issues that should and could occupy the opposition camp? There should
only be the following issues,
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Strategies
to remove the regimes,
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Violence
vs. non-violence,
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Internal
resistance vs. external assistance,
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There
should only be broad discussions for the purposes of synchronizing
views, and not for the imposition of their views, on the following
issues,
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How to
ensure that changes or transition in government is as peaceful and
as smooth possible,
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What are
the criteria for selecting the transitional government and the
transitional national assembly,
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How to
ensure that the next government is accountable and transparent, and
broadly agreeing on the milestones towards a full Constitutional and
representative democracy,
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How to
ensure that power in the next government does not get usurped by the
few, and ensuring that members of the government abide by strict
Codes of Ethics and Conflict of Interest Guidelines,
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How to
create a flexible political system that is able to adapt to changing
realities and prevailing public views,
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Identifying and prioritizing the large number of issues that the
next government will surely face from Day One. These are social,
economic, political, and legal issues that cannot wait for another
day.
On Merits
of Various Strategies to Remove the Regime
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Non-Violence vs. Violence
There are some fellow countrymen who advocate for resorting to ‘armed’
struggle to remove the regime. This is tantamount to advocating for a
‘Coup d’etat’. My belief on this is probably too simple – violence
begets violence.
The first question is whether we are waging a struggle to rid of PIA or
is it to rid of PIAs. Eritrea is now fighting not only to remove the
current regime but also to create a democratic Eritrea where differences
are resolved through the principles of non-violence, democratic values,
and mutual respect.
Unfortunately, politics is all about momentum. If we adopt the use of
‘violence’ or ‘armed struggle’ to rid of the regime, we create a
political atmosphere where political differences – regardless of their
extremity or severity – are resolved through violence. It would be naïve
to believe that those who come to power through ‘armed struggle’ or
‘violence’ will willingly hand over power to the people. Military mind
is just that – belief in strength at the end of the barrel.
The second point is a lesson to be learned from our liberation
struggle. There will be a struggle between the political leadership in
Diaspora against those ‘armed wing’ on the soils of Eritrea. We can
refer to our own history to learn of the end results. In general, the
political leadership in Diaspora is marginalized in a military
government than in popular revolution that has better chance of evolving
towards a democratic government. Failing to learn this is to unlearn
from our own history.
History of democracy teaches us that democracy is never handed over to
its citizens from the top. One can only be skeptical about a ‘new’
military government brought about through ‘violence’ or ‘armed struggle’
contains within it the ‘seeds of democracy’. There is no such thing as
‘benevolent dictator’.
Advocating for setting up ‘armed wing’ or resorting to violence might be
psychological warfare against the regime without any real intention of
pursuing that avenue. But politics is about gaining the right
perception and momentum to achieve a specific objective. An individual,
party, or grouping that advocates for armed struggle will find it
difficult, if not impossible, in the future to reverse the perception
that general public have towards that individual, party, or grouping.
Unfortunately, there are no shortcuts to democracy.
The only ones that can demand and ensure that democracy blossoms in
Eritrea, as anywhere else, are the people themselves. Substituting
‘armed wing’ or ‘violence’ for the people to bring about change is to
usurp the evolution towards democracy. There is currently enough
momentum within the general Eritrean public to lead towards a true
‘people’s revolution’. The challenge and our efforts should only be
concentrated on how to direct and harness it to achieve our ultimate
objective of building a democratic Eritrea.
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Internal
Resistance Vs External Assistance
I have already discussed in my previous articles the dangers of inviting
external assistance to bring about a change of government, and just as
important to bring about democratic system of government. This is
especially problematic when a country that has various outstanding
issues with Eritrea is the one extending the assistance. It would be
naïve to believe that in a very slippery world of politics, gentlemanly
agreements will carry the day. This is especially true where our
experience with that government is only fresh in our memories.
Moreover, the motives and underlying beliefs of those opposition groups
that advocate for external assistance can be determined without the
benefit of actual declarations from those groups. Advocating for
external assistance is tantamount to believing that the Eritrean people
cannot bring about change in government. This is an indictment against
the people. It is safe to deduce that people who cannot bring about
change in government, cannot demand and protect democratic reforms. As
stated earlier, it is very rare in history where democracy has evolved
through the ‘goodwill’ of the ruling elite. Far more often than not, it
is the public who must demand reform and democracy through public
resistance. The next natural question is, does an opposition camp that
believes the Eritrean public cannot bring about change in government,
believe in bringing about democracy from top down?
Taking
On Too Much Responsibility
Few weeks ago
I read an interesting article that warned against the dangers of certain
opposition parties within the opposition camp taking upon themselves too
much responsibility. It was narrated through personal experience at
work. I would like to add to that.
The danger is
not just that one party would take upon itself too much responsibility,
but that the opposition camp as a whole is taking upon itself far more
responsibility than it is capable of addressing. The opposition camp
should limit its responsibility to what is achievable given its limited
logistics, finances and other factors.
Conclusion
The crying
slogan within the opposition camp is to achieve ‘unity’ through ‘minimum
program’. The minimum programs can only be,
a.
To remove the regime through peaceful and internal resistance,
b.
To synchronize views, or one-step further is to draft the broad
programs that will ensure that Eritrea evolves towards democratic
nation.
To
advocate for any specific issues other than to what pertains to removing
the regime at this time is not plausible. No grouping has the
public mandate, and the many Eritreans that will make up the
transitional government and transitional national assembly are not
represented in Diaspora. At best, the ‘negotiations’ among the
opposition groups in Diaspora can be regarded no more than glorified
‘discussions’ or ‘debates’ – they are simply academic.
However, the
continued proliferation of opposition political parties on endless
issues, and the ongoing debates within the opposition camp do raise a
number of important concerns,
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Can our aspiring politicians be able to prioritize issues?
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Can our aspiring politicians and active citizens be able
to separate basic issues from specific political platforms and policies?
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Would members of our opposition camp be able to negotiate
on various issues while agreeing on basic principles?
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What the opposition groups in Diaspora are unable to do in
exile, would they be able to do it in post-PFDJ Eritrea?
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Wouldn’t complicating political issues at this time play
right into the hands of the PFDJ regime, which has enjoyed certain
success in its divide-and-rule politics?
One can raise
many other issues. We can only enrich the opposition camp by addressing
relevant issues today, and in the process being able to synchronize our
views. If Eritrea is to overcome its dire situation today and build a
free, democratic, and prosperous nation, we have to be able to address
issues in comprehensive manner, understand the concepts of mandates and
precedence. Democracy has its own rules, its own definitions - and its
limitations. If everybody gives their own personal definitions of
democracy, freedom, and rights – democracy will face tough ride.
Reformists
must concentrate their efforts to advocate for transparency, and
accountability to remain the central focus of our institution building –
and which should be the rallying cry of all Eritreans who wish to see
democracy to blossom in Eritrea. At the center of accountability and
transparency are the Code of Ethics and the Conflict of Guidelines for
our politicians, and public servants in general. For instance,
politicians who get wasted (drunk) abdicate their symbolic roles, and
brings into question their political judgments. As advocates for
freedoms, rights, and democracy, reformists should not complicate basic
issues with its byproducts. The function of reformists and
advocates is to ensure that Eritrea become truly democratic. As
byproduct, issues of government structure, laws, minority rights, and
other contentious issues will be resolved through public debates and
participation. Reformists must stay guard against those who beat the
democracy drums the loudest, but who may not necessarily believe that it
is achievable in Eritrea. Some believe that playing the power
musical chairs is the only way to ensure that one’s political agenda
gets implemented, and not necessarily through true public debates and
participation. Free and open public media will remain the central
instrument to usher in a true democratic nation. Having said that, it
does not mean that independent public media does not its shortcomings –
in fact it has plenty of it. But, its positive role by far outweighs
its shortcomings.
It is the
wish of every Eritrean that ‘unity’ is achieved among the opposition
parties not because of external pressure, but because it contains within
it the seeds of politically mature and realistic political programs that
will assist Eritrea to remove the regime and to finally embark on its
long-term aspiration of becoming a free and democratic nation. If there
are negotiations taking place in Khartoum over specific issues such as
centralization or decentralization of government structures, or other
critical but ‘byproduct’ issues that can only be decided by the Eritrean
general public, these negotiations are simply a waste of efforts – and
worse, these negotiations only manage to hinder us, and more importantly
the suffering Eritrean people, from realizing our number one and number
two objectives.
Members of
the opposition camp must measure their contributions to the opposition
camp by what they can contribute to strengthen the opposition camp in
achieving its priorities based on basic principles rather than measuring
their strength by what they can take away from the opposition camp.
Unrelated Observations
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Many wonder
why ‘giffa’ is conducted when PIA leaves Eritrea to visit foreign
countries. Coup d’etat usually occur when a leader embarks on foreign
trips. One can only deduce that PIA is preempting any possibility of
attempts to dislodge him during his foreign trips by attempting to
break up any possible cells that may exist within Asmara. It is only
one more sign of the regime’s paranoia, and is reflective of the
regime’s belief that it is only steps away from its removal.
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The UN
representatives in Eritrea expressed their concerns about Eritrea
resettling internally displaced Eritreans in the demilitarized zone
(DMZ). In fact, my belief is that the Eritrean government took too
long to resettle them. The DMZ is setup entirely in Eritrean
territory, and my understanding is that most, if not all, the disputed
areas are under Ethiopian occupation. Thus, the Eritrean government
cannot be settling the IDPs in disputed areas. The purpose of DMZ is
to distance the two warring armies, and not to hinder the right of the
Eritrean government to administer its own sovereign territory, which
includes the DMZ. Just because the Ethiopian government does not see
fit to implement the binding international border decision does not
mean that our fellow countrymen should continue to suffer in refugee
camps. Without violating any domestic and international laws, the
number one priority for the current as well as future Eritrean
governments should always be the Eritrean people – period. Positive
gestures or goodwill should never come at the expense or mistreatment
of the Eritrean people. A government that respects its own people is
the only one that can earn respect from its own people and, just as
important, from abroad.
Berhan Hagos
February 26,
2005
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