Editorials

               

National Unity Is Our Central

and Democratic Objective

ELF-RC Information and Cultural Office

(23/2/2005)

Making Sound Strategic Solutions

The Nharnet Team:

(Feb 12, 2005)

In Search of a Victory Strategy

By Nharnet Team (Feb 9, 2005)

Recollections of a Prisoner:

By  Nharnet Team (Feb 6, 2005)

February : Dates in Eritrean History

Nharnet Team (Feb 6, 2005)

Tough and Complex

Challenges Ahead for EDA 

The ELF-RC Information and

Cultural Office (1/2/2005)

Blocco Indipendenza

and Khartoum Meeting of the Opposition:

What Similarities?

Woldeyesus Ammar (Jan 18, 2005

A Broad Coalition, A winning Formula

Nharnet Team (Jan 15, 2005)

From the Experiences of the

Eritrean Liberation Army (ELA)

Part VIII and Final

By Nharnet Team (Jan 13, 2005)

Eritrea’s Transition Phase

From Dictatorship to Democracy

The ELF-RC Information &

Cultural Office, 13/01/2005

January : Some Dates in Eritrean History

Nharnet Team (Jan. 8, 2005)

The Eritrean Opposition:

What New Year Resolutions?

Nharnet Team (December 31, 2004)

As The Wheel Turns

Nharnet Team (December 1st, 2004)

For ELF-RC Members

And Supporters,  1st of December Is

Eritrean Martyrs’ Day

Nharnet Team (December 1st, 2004)

Opposition Demonstration in Washington DC

The Nharnet Team (November 23, 2004)

Saleh Eyay:

Member of a Remarkable

Generation that Was

By Woldeyesus Ammar

(November 14, 2004)

Eritrea Today:

Agonizing Indices of Misery

Nharnet Editorial (November 6, 2004)

November: Dates in Eritrean History

(And a Reading on ‘Waala’ Biet Giorghis)

Nharnet Team (November 4, 2004)

ELF-RC Information Office

Denies Allegations by Herui Tedla

Nharnet Team (October 30, 2004)

Let’s Not Give Room

To ‘Warlordism’ in Eritrea

 Nharnet Editorial (October 28, 2004)

From the Experiences of the ELA  (Part V)

The Nharnet Team (October 21, 2004)

The Need for Credible and Acceptable Coalition of the Opposition

The ELF-RC Information and Cultural Office

18.10.2004

At  33rd Anniversary  of

The 1971 Congress, ELF-RC

Described as ‘Dynamic Democracy’

Nharnet Team, 14 October 2004

Forging a United Patriotic Opposition

Nharnet Team, October 10, 2004

From the Experiences of the ELA (Part IV)

The Nharnet Team (6/10/2004)

How Veterans Told the Story of the First 10 Years of ELA

The Nharnet Team (October 1, 2004)

Changing Times and Changing Roles

Nharnet Editorial (October 1, 2004)

From the Experiences of the ELA (Part III)

The Nharnet Team (30/9/2004)

Three Years Ago Today

Nharnet Editorial (19/9/2004)

From the Experiences of the ELA (Part II)

(12/9/2004)

The Speaker of ELF-RC, Ibrahim Mohamed Ali, Urges Eritrean Politicians To Admit  Past Mistakes, Excesses

 (10/9/2004)

September 1st Puts Public Trust to the Test

(1/9/2004)

الوحدة الوطنية الارترية ...... بين الأمس واليوم

بقلم / ابراهيم محمد علي

RC Speaker Urges Libya’s Colonel Gadafy

(30/8/2004)

لجنة الحوار الوطني

K´DÃï aL´D A²Vgñ so
Irpq Šmk …}kmkq|:
ELF-RC Proposal for Unity of the Eritrean Opposition
†LK H©ö{q |§ odh‘Moñ ‘é©ölq „íXqV (PDF)

CONCLUDING STATEMENT:

ARABIC  ENGLISH       TIGRINIA

 

Mandate

 

The debates that are occupying our fellow Eritreans in Diaspora in general, and our opposition parties in particular, raise a number of concerns regarding our bearing on the burning issues today, consistency in our positions, unpredictable precedence for the future democratic Eritrea, and many other issues.

 

I am not a party to the negotiations taking place in Khartoum.  The issues I raise in this article are probably being discussed, and if not I would like to take this opportunity to add my own perspective on the debates taking place in the opposition camp.  The main purpose of this article, as are my other articles, remains to continue the public debates in order to understand and learn from each other the challenges facing Eritrea today and for years to come.

 

I find the views and position expounded by some of my fellow writers on the Internet and some of our aspiring politicians in Diaspora to be inconsistent with our common belief of building a democratic Eritrea. 

 

Some may argue that the opposition camp should concentrate on launching and focusing its criticism at the regime rather than spreading around the criticisms to include the opposition camp.  In my view, the regime is doing a tremendous job of shooting itself and no one, except extremely few, needs convincing that the regime needs to be removed.  As for the opposition camp that is aspiring to play critical role in the current struggle to remove the regime and, even more importantly, in post-PFDJ Eritrea, it must build the right momentum and perception today that will carry it into tomorrow’s Eritrea.  The opposition camp needs and should encourage feedback from the public to synchronize its views today because the task of rehabilitating and building a nation does not afford the luxury of time.

 

Issues of the Nature of Opposition Political Parties in Diaspora

 

My first confusion revolves around what the nature of the opposition political parties in Diaspora is.  During the struggle for liberation, the liberation movements were referred to as ‘Front’ or ‘Movement’ to suggest that each movement contained within it various ideas and convictions regarding the future of Eritrea, but that during the struggle for independence these ideas and convictions were put aside for one aim of only – struggle for independence. 

 

In contrast, ‘party’ largely refers to association of (like-minded) members with specific position on a full range of very specific issues and policies.

 

Next come the questions,

1.      If any of the opposition groupings consider themselves as ‘political parties’ then,

Should an opposition ‘political party’ tie-in [link] its specific political agendas and issues with the general, basic, commonly accepted, and underlying issues of building democratic institutions in Eritrea?

                                                                   i.  If yes [ties in], the implication is that a political party will accept working towards building democratic institutions and abide by its democratic principles only if the other ‘parties’ accept its specific agendas.

                                                                 ii.  If no [no tie in], the implication is that a political party must work towards building democratic institutions as the bigger and more critical issue, and put aside specific issues for another day until democratic institutions begin to take shape.

                                                                iii.  The third answer might be, why can’t a ‘party’ advocate for its own issues and the common issues at the same time.   The problem of this ‘want all’ stance is that as there are many ‘parties’ that have common stance on the need for ‘democratic institutions’ but different stance on specific issues.  When these different ‘parties’ meet and negotiate various issues, the issue that gets sacrificed is the common stance or the debate on ‘how to build democratic institutions’.   In the end, the debate on ‘how to build democratic institutions’ is taken for granted and put in the back burner to the detriment of the most critical issue. 

 

2.      If any opposition grouping consider itself as a ‘Front’ and/or ‘Movement’ for the benefit of all Eritreans then,

a.  The ‘Front’ or ‘Movement’ cannot commit itself to any specific issues other than advocating for broad principles of democracy, freedom, and basic rights,

b.  The ‘Front’s’ or ‘Movement’s’ mission, or raison d’etre, will be for one specific purpose, which is to remove the regime and thus creating the initial conducive conditions for building democratic institution.  

c.  The ‘Front’ or ‘Movement’ cannot form ‘unity’ with any ‘party’ that advocates for specific issue, but can only form ‘unity’ with other ‘Fronts’ or ‘Movements’.

 

 

Issues of Principle & Precedence

 

Recently certain opposition parties have expressed their views that they will not compromise on their principles.  In response, some writers have criticized these parties for raising the issue of principles because all the other parties also have their own principles.  These writers argue that no individual ‘party’ has exclusive ownership of ‘principles’.  In my view, this is not a correct view.

 

Principle of Non-Violence

 

If ‘unity’ is achieved between one party that advocates for non-violence as a means of struggling to remove the regime and another party that advocates for violence, the former has relinquished its principle of non-violence.

 

 

 

Principle of Sovereignty

 

If ‘unity’ is achieved between one party that advocates for internal resistance as a means of struggling to remove the regime and another party that advocates for external assistance, the former has relinquished its principle of sovereignty.

 

Naturally, the party that will express its intention of maintaining its principles is the one that is directly or indirectly asked or forced into relinquishing it.   

 

There is also the danger of creating precedence.  In our current situation, as well as in the future, there will be continued call for ‘unity’.  If ‘unity’ continues to be achieved by including groups that increasing become radicalized, a dangerous precedence is created by the eventual radicalization of ‘principles’ too.

 

 

Issues of Mandate

 

The question is how does ‘an opposition party in Diaspora’ receive its mandate.

 

1.      Does it receive its mandate from its members?  If so, how does a mandate from its members be projected or extrapolated to mandate of all Eritreans given to that party?

2.      Does one party purporting to belong to one certain ethnic or religious group claim to represent the aspirations and views of that certain ethnic or religious group on the virtue of belonging to that group? 

 

It is critical that fellow Eritreans are able to distinguish between what individuals and/or parties project to be their mandates against who has the basic rights to give mandate on national issues. More often than not, there is a big gaping hole.  Without explicit and democratic process, no individual nor ‘political group’ can truly claim to have received a mandate from the Eritrean public.  A political group or party without mandates is at best an advocacy group – nothing more.  Strictly speaking, political parties are created through laws and rules of the country and based on the Constitution and relevant laws.  

 

Even in the future, there will be a real danger that even those democratically elected representatives of the people may overstep their mandate.  Being elected does not give a representative a blank check to propagate un-mandated views and stands once elected.  The representative is the servant or a reflection of its constituent, not its boss.

 

In fact, the advent of technology may diminish the powers of representatives (or ‘Members of Parliament’).  In the old days, logistical reasons required that constituents give the most power of decision to their elected representatives.  In the near future, it may not be necessary for representatives to cast their votes on issues in the House or Senate, and instead high-tech will allow constituents to cast their votes on any issues directly online.  This is empowerment.  

 

 

 

Mandate, Legality & Unity Negotiations

 

My next questions are extensions of the points of I have discussed above.  These questions relate to the period of the current struggle.

 

  1. If one party advocates for very basic and broad principles, and another party advocates for very specific political agendas, how does one reconcile the two positions to form a unity?

 

  1. If the party advocating for very basic and broad principles does not believe it has a mandate to take a stand on specific issues, would this party be able to form genuine alliance with a party that advocates for specific political agendas?  Would not the party advocating for very basic and broad principles violate its own ‘party’ mandate and take on mandates not explicitly given to it by the Eritrean public?

 

  1. Enforceability – even if opposition political parties in Diaspora somehow manage to reluctantly accept each other’s political agendas, does it necessarily mean that it will be valid and enforceable in free and democratic Eritrea when elections take place?  What will ensure that these ‘unity’ members remain committed to each other and implement their agreements in post-PFDJ Eritrea?  Or, even if they do remain committed to each other, does it imply that there are tacit agreements to bypass the Eritrean public and implement or sock it to the unsuspecting public.  If it is the Eritrean general public that will freely debate and decide on how to deal and dispose of any issues, the political maneuverings in Diaspora politics is academic at best.  The current political wrangling in the opposition camp can then only be regarded as taking away from our energy and resolve to remove the regime, and without adding much value to debates in the future free and democratic Eritrea.

 

My next confusion revolves around the following questions,

 

  1. Can the issue of official languages, ethnical, religious laws, political parties, land, centralized or decentralized government be discussed and decided upon without addressing a whole range of other economic, social, political, and legal issues.  Can one party just say we advocate, for example, for specific ‘official language’ without addressing a whole range of other associated challenges and issues.

 

  1. Can’t one say that entertaining some of these basic issues and political platforms are tantamount to attempting to draft or re-draft Eritrea’s Constitution?  If the ‘unity’ negotiation is tantamount to drafting or re-drafting Eritrea’s Constitution, do these parties have the mandate to do so?

 

  1. Even if these ‘unity’ members draft their own hidden Constitution, it would be illegal if the next transitional ‘unity’ government or transitional national assembly promulgates or imposes it without the public’s blessing.   

 

  1. This brings me to my next question, who will make up the transitional national assembly?  It is probably suffice to say that it should be represented by a whole range of the Eritrean population, of which most members of the Eritrean transitional national assembly will be made up from those Eritreans in Eritrea.   These members are not party to the negotiations taking place in Diaspora.  What will force the majority of members of the transitional government/assembly elected from within Eritrea to abide by the terms agreed on by the opposition camp in Diaspora?  Does the fact that those in Diaspora forcefully attempt to negotiate and incorporate wide range of issues into the opposition agenda imply that they are attempting to bypass the transitional national assembly, and more importantly the general public?  What assurance is there that those opposition parties in Diaspora participating in ‘unity’ will not breakaway and join forces with other ‘local’ members in the transitional national assembly that may oppose some or all of the issues agreed upon in Diaspora?

 

 

Possible Relevant and Timely Issues in the Opposition Camp

 

What are the issues that should and could occupy the opposition camp?  There should only be the following issues,

 

  1. Strategies to remove the regimes,

    1. Violence vs. non-violence,

    2. Internal resistance vs. external assistance,

 

  1. There should only be broad discussions for the purposes of synchronizing views, and not for the imposition of their views, on the following issues,

    1. How to ensure that changes or transition in government is as peaceful and as smooth possible,

    2. What are the criteria for selecting the transitional government and the transitional national assembly,

    3. How to ensure that the next government is accountable and transparent, and broadly agreeing on the milestones towards a full Constitutional and representative democracy,

    4. How to ensure that power in the next government does not get usurped by the few, and ensuring that members of the government abide by strict Codes of Ethics and Conflict of Interest Guidelines,

    5. How to create a flexible political system that is able to adapt to changing realities and prevailing public views,

    6. Identifying and prioritizing the large number of issues that the next government will surely face from Day One.  These are social, economic, political, and legal issues that cannot wait for another day.

 

On Merits of Various Strategies to Remove the Regime

 

  1. Non-Violence vs. Violence

 

There are some fellow countrymen who advocate for resorting to ‘armed’ struggle to remove the regime.  This is tantamount to advocating for a ‘Coup d’etat’.  My belief on this is probably too simple – violence begets violence.

 

The first question is whether we are waging a struggle to rid of PIA or is it to rid of PIAs.  Eritrea is now fighting not only to remove the current regime but also to create a democratic Eritrea where differences are resolved through the principles of non-violence, democratic values, and mutual respect.

 

Unfortunately, politics is all about momentum.  If we adopt the use of ‘violence’ or ‘armed struggle’ to rid of the regime, we create a political atmosphere where political differences – regardless of their extremity or severity – are resolved through violence. It would be naïve to believe that those who come to power through ‘armed struggle’ or ‘violence’ will willingly hand over power to the people.  Military mind is just that – belief in strength at the end of the barrel. 

 

The second point is a lesson to be learned from our liberation struggle.  There will be a struggle between the political leadership in Diaspora against those ‘armed wing’ on the soils of Eritrea.  We can refer to our own history to learn of the end results.  In general, the political leadership in Diaspora is marginalized in a military government than in popular revolution that has better chance of evolving towards a democratic government.  Failing to learn this is to unlearn from our own history.

 

History of democracy teaches us that democracy is never handed over to its citizens from the top. One can only be skeptical about a ‘new’ military government brought about through ‘violence’ or ‘armed struggle’ contains within it the ‘seeds of democracy’.  There is no such thing as ‘benevolent dictator’.

 

Advocating for setting up ‘armed wing’ or resorting to violence might be psychological warfare against the regime without any real intention of pursuing that avenue.  But politics is about gaining the right perception and momentum to achieve a specific objective.  An individual, party, or grouping that advocates for armed struggle will find it difficult, if not impossible, in the future to reverse the perception that general public have towards that individual, party, or grouping.  Unfortunately, there are no shortcuts to democracy. 

 

The only ones that can demand and ensure that democracy blossoms in Eritrea, as anywhere else, are the people themselves.  Substituting ‘armed wing’ or ‘violence’ for the people to bring about change is to usurp the evolution towards democracy.  There is currently enough momentum within the general Eritrean public to lead towards a true ‘people’s revolution’.  The challenge and our efforts should only be concentrated on how to direct and harness it to achieve our ultimate objective of building a democratic Eritrea.  

 

  1. Internal Resistance Vs External Assistance

 

I have already discussed in my previous articles the dangers of inviting external assistance to bring about a change of government, and just as important to bring about democratic system of government.  This is especially problematic when a country that has various outstanding issues with Eritrea is the one extending the assistance.  It would be naïve to believe that in a very slippery world of politics, gentlemanly agreements will carry the day.  This is especially true where our experience with that government is only fresh in our memories.

 

Moreover, the motives and underlying beliefs of those opposition groups that advocate for external assistance can be determined without the benefit of actual declarations from those groups. Advocating for external assistance is tantamount to believing that the Eritrean people cannot bring about change in government.  This is an indictment against the people.  It is safe to deduce that people who cannot bring about change in government, cannot demand and protect democratic reforms.  As stated earlier, it is very rare in history where democracy has evolved through the ‘goodwill’ of the ruling elite.  Far more often than not, it is the public who must demand reform and democracy through public resistance.  The next natural question is, does an opposition camp that believes the Eritrean public cannot bring about change in government, believe in bringing about democracy from top down?

 

 

Taking On Too Much Responsibility

 

Few weeks ago I read an interesting article that warned against the dangers of certain opposition parties within the opposition camp taking upon themselves too much responsibility.  It was narrated through personal experience at work.  I would like to add to that.

 

The danger is not just that one party would take upon itself too much responsibility, but that the opposition camp as a whole is taking upon itself far more responsibility than it is capable of addressing.  The opposition camp should limit its responsibility to what is achievable given its limited logistics, finances and other factors.

 

Conclusion

 

The crying slogan within the opposition camp is to achieve ‘unity’ through ‘minimum program’.  The minimum programs can only be,

 

a.       To remove the regime through peaceful and internal resistance,

 

b.      To synchronize views, or one-step further is to draft the broad programs that will ensure that Eritrea evolves towards democratic nation.

 

To advocate for any specific issues other than to what pertains to removing the regime at this time is not plausible.  No grouping has the public mandate, and the many Eritreans that will make up the transitional government and transitional national assembly are not represented in Diaspora.  At best, the ‘negotiations’ among the opposition groups in Diaspora can be regarded no more than glorified ‘discussions’ or ‘debates’ – they are simply academic.

 

However, the continued proliferation of opposition political parties on endless issues, and the ongoing debates within the opposition camp do raise a number of important concerns,

 

·        Can our aspiring politicians be able to prioritize issues?

·        Can our aspiring politicians and active citizens be able to separate basic issues from specific political platforms and policies?

·        Would members of our opposition camp be able to negotiate on various issues while agreeing on basic principles?

·        What the opposition groups in Diaspora are unable to do in exile, would they be able to do it in post-PFDJ Eritrea?

·        Wouldn’t complicating political issues at this time play right into the hands of the PFDJ regime, which has enjoyed certain success in its divide-and-rule politics?

 

One can raise many other issues.  We can only enrich the opposition camp by addressing relevant issues today, and in the process being able to synchronize our views.  If Eritrea is to overcome its dire situation today and build a free, democratic, and prosperous nation, we have to be able to address issues in comprehensive manner, understand the concepts of mandates and precedence.  Democracy has its own rules, its own definitions - and its limitations.  If everybody gives their own personal definitions of democracy, freedom, and rights – democracy will face tough ride.

 

Reformists must concentrate their efforts to advocate for transparency, and accountability to remain the central focus of our institution building – and which should be the rallying cry of all Eritreans who wish to see democracy to blossom in Eritrea.  At the center of accountability and transparency are the Code of Ethics and the Conflict of Guidelines for our politicians, and public servants in general.  For instance, politicians who get wasted (drunk) abdicate their symbolic roles, and brings into question their political judgments.  As advocates for freedoms, rights, and democracy, reformists should not complicate basic issues with its byproducts.  The function of reformists and advocates is to ensure that Eritrea become truly democratic.  As byproduct, issues of government structure, laws, minority rights, and other contentious issues will be resolved through public debates and participation.  Reformists must stay guard against those who beat the democracy drums the loudest, but who may not necessarily believe that it is achievable in Eritrea.  Some believe that playing the power musical chairs is the only way to ensure that one’s political agenda gets implemented, and not necessarily through true public debates and participation.  Free and open public media will remain the central instrument to usher in a true democratic nation.  Having said that, it does not mean that independent public media does not its shortcomings – in fact it has plenty of it.  But, its positive role by far outweighs its shortcomings. 

 

It is the wish of every Eritrean that ‘unity’ is achieved among the opposition parties not because of external pressure, but because it contains within it the seeds of politically mature and realistic political programs that will assist Eritrea to remove the regime and to finally embark on its long-term aspiration of becoming a free and democratic nation.  If there are negotiations taking place in Khartoum over specific issues such as centralization or decentralization of government structures, or other critical but ‘byproduct’ issues that can only be decided by the Eritrean general public, these negotiations are simply a waste of efforts – and worse, these negotiations only manage to hinder us, and more importantly the suffering Eritrean people, from realizing our number one and number two objectives.       

 

Members of the opposition camp must measure their contributions to the opposition camp by what they can contribute to strengthen the opposition camp in achieving its priorities based on basic principles rather than measuring their strength by what they can take away from the opposition camp.

 

Unrelated Observations

 

  1. Many wonder why ‘giffa’ is conducted when PIA leaves Eritrea to visit foreign countries.  Coup d’etat usually occur when a leader embarks on foreign trips.  One can only deduce that PIA is preempting any possibility of attempts to dislodge him during his foreign trips by attempting to break up any possible cells that may exist within Asmara.  It is only one more sign of the regime’s paranoia, and is reflective of the regime’s belief that it is only steps away from its removal.

  

  1. The UN representatives in Eritrea expressed their concerns about Eritrea resettling internally displaced Eritreans in the demilitarized zone (DMZ).  In fact, my belief is that the Eritrean government took too long to resettle them.  The DMZ is setup entirely in Eritrean territory, and my understanding is that most, if not all, the disputed areas are under Ethiopian occupation. Thus, the Eritrean government cannot be settling the IDPs in disputed areas.  The purpose of DMZ is to distance the two warring armies, and not to hinder the right of the Eritrean government to administer its own sovereign territory, which includes the DMZ.  Just because the Ethiopian government does not see fit to implement the binding international border decision does not mean that our fellow countrymen should continue to suffer in refugee camps.  Without violating any domestic and international laws, the number one priority for the current as well as future Eritrean governments should always be the Eritrean people – period.  Positive gestures or goodwill should never come at the expense or mistreatment of the Eritrean people.  A government that respects its own people is the only one that can earn respect from its own people and, just as important, from abroad. 

 

Berhan Hagos

February 26, 2005

 

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