Managing Transition

With all the infighting that continues to plague the opposition camp in Diaspora, the fundamental issues of both how to remove the regime and embark on a path to stable and viable democratic Eritrea have been relegated to the backburner. 

A friend of mine who visited Eritrea recently told me an interesting story about one of the episodes of Eritrea’s Oprah Winfrey, Manna Kidane’s, television show, where one time the topic of discussion in a television studio in front of an audience was about what the reasons are for AIDS to spread so quickly in Eritrea.   Some members of the audience said that it was the uncontrolled nightclubs, such as Warsai Nightclub, that are responsible for spreading of AIDS.  Other members of the audience said that it was the lack of parental control that was responsible for this problem.  Many in the audience gave every other reason imaginable, except the one major reason that no one dared to mention – ‘Warsai Yekealo’.   No one dared to say that our youths in the endless Warsai-Yikealo campaign, who have lost all hope about their future, might drive our youths to engage in reckless acts, which have contributed immensely to spreading of AIDS in Eritrea.

When real or potential cause is not raised because of taboo politics, fear of imprisonment or even derision, real solutions can’t be found. 

There are a couple of taboo [political] issues that are plaguing the opposition camp, which if not given their due attention, will ensure that PFDJ extends its day in power by that long.  The question is, ‘does the opposition camp have the strength to overcome its partisan politics to address REAL issues, or will it succumb to simply choosing to skirt around issues with the hope that some miracles will ensure that problems work themselves out?’   But that is NOT LEADERSHIP.   Leadership, and finding real solutions, can never be based on wishful thinking, miracles, or on people getting tired of criticizing.  Let us keep quite and the people will soon forget isn’t leadership, and will not make problems go away.   Leadership is the ability to define critical issues and then to propose its solutions, to convince the public that these are the critical issues and solutions, and then to translate its proposed solutions into clear and vigorous plan-of-action.  To date, most political organizations, and definitely EDA, have not shown its inclination for such leadership responsibilities.

EDA has failed to begin discussing the critical issues out of fear that any kind of real discussion will only create rift within a fragile alliance.  Most of the issues that are on EDA’s Charter are issues that can only be resolved in post-PFDJ Eritrea.  Naturally, it is always fruitful to begin discussing long-term post-PFDJ issues, but the final decision on these issues will be left to the Eritrean public and decided in democratic manner.  On the other hand, there are other burning issues that can’t wait, and are simply begging for leadership to address them.  A fragile alliance isn’t an excuse for lethargy, for inaction, nor for lack of leadership.

If members of EDA are seriously interested in addressing fundamental issues, the following critical issues must be addressed and common public declaration made, and some negotiation strategies must formulated.  These are issues that can NOT simply be swept under the rug, nor left for another day to be addressed.  These are today’s questions – today’s burning issues.  The burning issues are,

First Issue:  What happens to the over 50,000 ex-EPLF fighters who are either civil servants, work for various PFDJ businesses organizations, PFDJ cadres, and those still in the army?

Second Issue: What happens to the army officers who have enriched themselves under PFDJ?

Third Issue:  What happens to ‘Warsai Yekealo’ servicemen who have been promised ‘compensations for their service’?

If the opposition camp in Diaspora is unable to reach pragmatic solutions to these issues, whatever other solutions EDA or its member organizations may reach are simply secondary.  If and when public uprising takes place, other factors will ensure that the opposition activities in Diaspora remain just that – an activity in Diaspora. 

At the end of the day, solving problems, effecting and managing transition is all about addressing peoples concerns and fears – giving them hope about the future, to respect their dignity, to provide them with security and bread on the table.  These are concerns that must be addressed immediately, and are not issues that can be addressed when one is in power.  By then it is too late!  Rapport must be established today!  Rapport isn’t about vilifying PFDJ only, nor exclusively blabbering about how one is democrat.  But rather it is the ability to address issues in everybody’s heart – ensuring stability and justice, while at the same time building the foundations of democratic Eritrea.  One without the other is building a nation on sandy foundation.

First Issue

            ‘Temeliska Etredio, Gedifkayo Aytieto!’

The vast majority of the over 50,000 ex-EPLF fighters are now settled, with responsibilities of over 200,000 family members and dependents.  These are people at every echelon of the Eritrean public sector.  It is safe to assume that the overwhelming majority within the opposition camp does not associate most of these ex-fighters as being the driving force behind PFDJ’s ruthless machine.  But we must send [in proactive manner] a clear and unequivocal message that the post-PFDJ government has vested interested in ensuring that this segment of the population remains fairly treated.  By clear message, it means the opposition camp must pro-actively convey this message, rather than expect this [ex-EPLF] segment to simply assume this fact.  Leadership isn’t about refraining from clearly communicating with groups with vested interest out of fear that another segment may misinterpret its intentions.  Leadership must identify potential conflicts and lay the bridgework in finding solutions.

A significant proportion of these ex-fighters will be approaching retirement age in the next few years.  PFDJ has not instituted, despite its declaration, any pension system that will secure the retirement of this as well as other segments of the Eritrean population.   For these groups, their retirement is simply guaranteed by hanging on to their jobs.  PFDJ is holding them hostage to its politics.

Let us throw in numbers for illustration purposes.  The PFDJ machinery has usurped all the businesses and the government’s treasury in Eritrea.  Unlike EPLF’s financial muscle when it took over government in 1991, the opposition camp doesn’t and will not have the same organized financial resource [if and] when they take over the post-PFDJ government.  By finance, we mean more than just printing money, and rather it includes liquid banking system, working Central Bank, hard currency reserves, and established revenue sources.  The options available for the next government pertaining to retiring ex-fighters are very challenging.  One option is for the next government to keep the civil service intact.  Alternatively, it can begin to retire the older generation.  If the next government begins to retire, say 3,000 ex-fighters a year, it will need

            3,000 retirees @ Nfa 1,500 per month average [to be adjusted for inflation]

                        1^st year:            Nfa 54 Million/year                   3,000 retirees

                        2^nd year:           Nfa 108 Million/year                 6,000 retirees

                        3^rd year:            Nfa 162 Million/year                 9,000 retirees

                        4^th year:            Nfa 216 Million/year                 12,000 retirees

If one adds up other financial requirements, one is left with a daunting task that awaits the next government.  This is where opposition groups should become leaders not only in challenging PFDJ, but by addressing a whole slew of other challenges facing Eritrea.  These opposition leaders should spell out what their plans are for removing and for delivering ‘first aid’ in the immediate period  following the removal of PFDJ.   Post-PFDJ Eritrea, a nation coming out of trauma at that, can’t wait in paralysis while those ‘new leaders’ continue their infighting over ‘non-immediate’ issues.

Unfortunately these are not problems for a regime that is counting down its last days; but they are one of the priority issues for the post-PFDJ government and for Eritrea in general.  Stable and viable democratic Eritrea can’t be built by ignoring or making/leaving insecure one huge and prominent segment of the population.  These are not issues that can wait while the government of the day debates, if ever, over the Constitution, Land, Zonal Administration, etc…  The opposition camp in Diaspora must take a pragmatic declaration on this issue along the following lines, not once in power [if ever], but as today’s issues while still in opposition in Diaspora,

1. Post-PFDJ government will not engage in ‘Mintsiltsal’.  Post-PFDJ government will consider the pension issue as its HIGH PRIORITY and will pursue every domestic resource and foreign assistance to set up and finance pension funds.

2. Post-PFDJ government will ensure that those civil servants less qualified for their positions are trained or retrained to deliver effective and efficient service to the public.

3. PFDJ cadres will also be given necessary trainings to deliver public services needed in post-PFDJ government.

4. The regular army will remain intact.

5. Any privatization of PFDJ businesses will take into consideration the welfare of employees working for those businesses.

Many ex-fighters may not support PFDJ, but this group can’t afford to take the risk that the post-PFDJ government will kick them out of their jobs and be thrown out on the streets with their families without roofs over their heads.  The issue isn’t political, but everything to do with basic survival.  This paranoia might be imaginary, but it has real political impact.  The opposition camp must send clear and unequivocal message to this group that will appease their apprehension.

To reiterate, our message to this group, and the public in general, should be, ‘yes there will be changes coming but for the better’.  We must continually send and reinforce positive message that encourages people to seek change.  We must convince them that we have working opposition organizations; bold and well-grounded leadership; that we have the blueprints to tackle the challenges left behind by the PFDJ regime, etc…  We should exude ‘real’ confidence!  If we continue with this lame duck opposition leadership that is unable to tackle real issues, unable to uphold and enforce its own rule-of-law, and conduct its affairs in secrecy rather than transparency, then we must seek other internal avenues to achieve our objectives.  Eritrea is hemorrhaging at a pace that may put this wonderful nation in unrecoverable comma.  That is why our patience can only have limits.

Naturally, the same concerns should be addressed for all freedom fighters, and not just ex-EPLF.

Issue Two

How to handle those army officers who are enriching themselves will be the trickiest of the many sensitive issues.   This is one of those issues where strong leadership is critical.  The challenge is how encourage these officers to abandon the PFDJ regime, and yet not encourage them to continue engaging in their embezzlement activities during the current regime.  Needless to say that those officers engaged in violation of other people’s natural rights will not be immune from prosecution under the laws of the country.

Nevertheless, the opposition leadership should be able to negotiate, if necessary in secrecy, to make the necessary arrangements to speed up the process of regime change.

Third Issue

Many Warsai (esp.) servicemen in the Warsai-Yikealo project have not either been paid or underpaid for their ‘national’ services, which for some has lasted almost a whole decade.  The PFDJ regime has been giving them false hopes that they would be compensated once demobilized.  Whatever amount, 5,000 or 10,000 Nfa or more, is that much more money they hope to use for various reasons.  In addition, these compensations are a form of their consolation for a life they have been robbed by the PFDJ regime.

Their real concerns are that the next government will not recognize their services, and thus these young servicemen will lose their compensation – on top of the time they have wasted in Warsai-Yekealo – A Double Blow for them.

The opposition camp should clearly declare that,

1. The post-PFDJ government will make the necessary compensations to the young servicemen for the time they have expended on the Warsai-Yekaelo projects.

2. The post-PFDJ government will engage in every effort to demobilize, rehabilitate, and reintegrate the servicemen.

3. The post-PFDJ government will consider the following issues as its priorities,

   1. Liberalize the Eritrean economy quickly to absorb demobilized servicemen into the private economy,

   2. Resolving affordable housing for demobilized servicemen who are at an age that must begin to settle down into family lives, etc…

Managing Transition

Not unlike natural disasters, efforts progress from primarily rescue operations, to providing emergency food and medical assistance, to rehabilitation, etc…   EDA’s preoccupation with issues that can only be addressed through public debates in post-PFDJ Eritrea can be compared with preoccupation with rehabilitation when what are needed to blueprints and action plans tantamount to rescue operations and emergency relief services.

Politics doesn’t begin with expounding an ideal situation, and then to administer ideal solutions.  Rather, we must begin from current reality, and then work through the different phases.  Managing transition from one-phase to the next phase requires full attention in terms of resource, including financial and human resources for that particular phase.  If the rescue operation and/or emergency phases are bungled up, rehabilitation becomes that much more difficult to undertake.  That is why it is critical that all efforts must be exerted to address issues at each stage of our transition.

Naturally, it is politically safer to raise issues that will take years to address and to ignore those that must be handled with urgency.  The questions of language, land, or zonal administration are not issues that can be measured against certain performance targets within a reasonable period of time.  Politicians only need to harp on these long-term issues without any risk of [our] performance evaluation [of them].

Managing Transition, especially in the political context, requires the following key components,

1. Leadership

   1. Ability to prioritize issues,

   2. Ability to enforce the rule-of-law [even organizational as precursor to national],

   3. Ability and credibility to reach out and to appease the various interest groups,

   4. Ability to negotiate fair tradeoffs among the competing interests.

2. Allocating resources

Eritrea is currently facing severe socio-economic crisis as a result of PFDJ’s scorched-earth policy to escape from its quagmire.  If the opposition camp has any aspiration to form the next government, it must begin to discuss and debate how it intends to allocate precious resources in the early years of the PFDJ regime.  It would be naïve to think that these same opposition groups will have the time nor the competency to govern a nation that might go through turmoil – the same turmoil that may bring down the PFDJ regime.  If the opposition camp doesn’t or can’t draw up a transitional blueprint on how to allocate resources for maximum stability before it hopes to form the next government, the opposition camp may only exacerbate the unstable situation in Eritrea.  We have to radically change the way we conduct our national business and national politics.   Otherwise, what makes us any different from PFDJ?  PFDJ undertakes all its national finance, policies, and programs in secrecy without the benefit of the participation of professionals, qualified people, and the general public.  In fact, one is left with the impression that the vast majority of our opposition leaders may not have full grasp of the socio-economic challenges.

3. Change

Transition means change.  Those who benefited under the old system will resist change, and conversely, those who did NOT benefit under the old system will welcome change.  It is critical that every effort is made to ensure those who may perceive or who may actually lose under transition are included in the process of change.   For some, their fears may not materialize and instead may end up benefiting as much or more under transition.  For others, some retraining may address their apprehension.  Still for others, simply reassurance may appease their apprehensions.  But the bottom line is that leaders charged with leading Eritrea through the transition period must be able to overcome backroom politics and address people’s concerns in direct and unequivocal manner.  Managing transition begins while in the opposition [esp. in Diaspora] and is about addressing and managing people’s concerns, fears, and apprehensions.

Leadership within the Opposition

As stated in my previous article, ‘EDA’s Performance Review’, EDA has to-date failed to show leadership in some of the defining issues since its inception six-months ago.  Unless EDA’s leadership recovers quickly from its comatose and address the defining issues, it would be naïve to believe that the same leadership would have the competence to address the vastly more challenging issues facing Eritrea.

Declaring on paper that one advocates for democracy is still a long-way from reality.  As the old adage says, ‘The proof of the pudding is in the eating’.  Especially when leadership is unable to uphold and enforce rule-of-law within its own organization, the so-called ‘leadership’ can’t usher in democratic institutions.  Second, as stated above, exclusively campaigning on vilifying the PFDJ regime on one hand, and advocating for democratic principles on the other hand, doesn’t necessarily indicate that leadership has full grasp of the immediate challenges.  Or, if leadership is aware of these challenges, it means that it doesn’t have the necessary conviction or confidence to tackle such challenging issue.  The result is lethargic performance.   

As eloquently expressed by many writers on the internet, the opposition camp must concentrate most of its efforts at removing the regime, and postpone taking stands on issues that need to be debated by the general Eritrean public in post-PFDJ Eritrea.  But the above issues need to be addressed to hasten the removal of the PFDJ regime.  As such, ignoring these issues for whatever reason is tantamount to indirectly giving life to the PFDJ regime.

Implicit choices are being made in our decision-making to remove the regime.  Is it better to keep the PFDJ regime [leadership] in power than reaching out to one large segment of the population that are perceived as being associated with PFDJ, or is it better to reach out to this segment [ex-EPLF] as a means to remove the PFDJ regime?  To-date, the opposition camp position has been crystal clear in its decision.  The result of our implicit decision is to slow down the struggle to remove the regime, and to increase the burden of pain on the Eritrean people.

I strongly believe that pro-active opposition groups must formulate explicit strategies to reach out to this [ex-EPLF] group and provide the necessary assurance to expedite the removal of the regime.  Reaching out to this ex-EPLF segment in Eritrea is no different than the alliance among the Kassel group, or the Frankfurt group, which transcended old political divides.  Leaving Eritrea is not the only manifestation of disagreement with the PFDJ regime.  Exile isn’t an option for many within this [ex-EPLF] segment.  Therefore we should be able to win their confidence from where they are.  If we are able to bring these groups onboard the opposition movement by winning over their confidence, even through their silent cooperation, we will achieve two objectives at once – first is speeding up PFDJ’s removal, and second we can ensure the stable transition  towards viable and stable democratic Eritrea.

EDA, Eritrea, and Eritreans are begging for pro-active, decisive, and skilled leadership.  There is no time to be patient with faltering leadership, or to wait for them to move down the learning curve in baby steps.  We need leadership that is bold, with grasp of the challenging issues and able to propose solutions to real challenges.   We want transparency.   Any other way, we are wasting our time in ‘hashewye’.  What have we learned from the crisis of EPLF/ELF, and especially the organizational challenges faced in our opposition struggle by ENA, EDA, National Salvation Front, etc…?    Nada, Zilch, Bado, Niente!   Let us become the learning leaderships, parties, organizations, and nation.

My derrière will get chewed for this one, but I challenge my readers to debate me on these issues.

On Other Thoughts

1.      Although Tom Downey’s article correctly reflects the quick socio-economic decline in Eritrea, the following comment doesn’t correctly reflect our culture.  I have read few articles written by foreigners that give undue credit to PIA.

      “Afewerki preached an ethos of self-sufficiency: demanding that all foreign aid be on Eritrea's terms and rejecting aid programs that wasted too much money on costly foreign consultants. This belief in self-sufficiency seemed to trickle down to the streets of the new nation, making it inconceivable that anybody, no matter how poor, would beg.” [Emphasis added]

      Dispatches,  What Went Wrong in Eritrea?  A country of whispers.
By Tom Downey,  Posted Wednesday, Sept. 7, 2005, at 9:06 AM PT

This comment makes it appear as if Eritrean belief in self-sufficiency was achieved due to PIA’s preaching.  In reality, it is our culture to be independent and self-sufficient!  PIA or any Eritrean liberation movements simply practiced their deep-rooted cultural values.  The credit goes to our forefathers!

2.      For those who like to monitor the mercury level of the Ethio-Eritrea conflict, it may have notched few degrees down the past few months.  The most critical component of war is logistics, which requires significant amount of ‘fuel’.  With fuel prices almost doubling over the past few months, these two countries do not have the necessary financial nor hard currency to undertake such crippling venture. 

Berhan Hagos

September 9, 2005