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No Easy Way
Out!
Suffice to say that
establishing a viable and stable democratic Eritrea begins with
establishing political, economic, social, religious, and other
institutions needed to sustain such objective. But institutions are
not machines built to one’s specifications in factories and then
installed to be put into operations immediately. Rather,
institutions are the slow, painful, and systematic interactions of
men/women to formulate the rules that allow them in carrying out their
actions for the purpose of achieving their stated objectives.
Rule-of-law, code of conduct, accountability, and transparency are the
cornerstone of institutions.
Eritrea’s challenge
remains how to transform itself from the armed struggle mentality that
brought about independence to a political system that will foster a
viable and stable democratic Eritrea, which we all aspire for. There
are many excuses why Eritrea is still a long-way from achieving
the status of mature democratic state. Some argue that the large
population remains uneducated, still tied to rural life, legacy of our
colonizers and now a brutal regime, division within our society, etc…
But all these are simply excuses. The most important
cornerstone of democratic societies is the rule-of-law, which has always
been practiced by our forefathers. The current breakdown in the
rule-of-law in Eritrea, and even within the opposition camp, is not a
growing pain towards creating democratic institutions in Eritrea, but
rather a regression from our centuries of tradition and history of
stable, fair, and law-abiding Eritrean society.
Some argue that
armed campaign is needed to bring about change. But there are no solid
arguments, both as principle and as strategy, to pursue such campaign in
our specific situation – even for rhetorical purposes. One
justification for advocating such armed campaign is that the political
campaign has been weak in removing the regime.
First, this
justification is incorrect in that the political campaign has been very
effective in isolating the regime and thus bringing it closer to its
downfall. In principle, pursuing armed campaign to resolve
internal conflicts sheds the blood of the innocents, and secondly
creates dangerous precedence for resolving internal challenges. Even
as strategy, there is no reason to believe that an armed campaign
will achieve any more success than a political campaign. In fact, armed
campaign may breath new life to the regime by creating further excuses
of ‘instability’ within Eritrea to continue its undeclared
‘state-of-emergency’. To the contrary, the absence of any kind of
‘insurgent based armed conflict’ will only lead to discontent from idle
and underpaid servicemen who wonder why they are made to rot in the
middle-of-nowhere. However, if the opposition camp pursues armed
campaign, the regime will find justification to keep the servicemen in
the army. Guess what, the servicemen will then first and foremost blame
‘armed insurgents’ for keeping them in the army. The regime will keep
reminding the servicemen that they can’t be demobilized because the
‘armed insurgents’ are jeopardizing the security of the country. As a
result, the servicemen’s frustration will be directed more towards the
‘armed insurgents’, and less towards the regime that is keeping them in
bondage.
The second
justification or call for pursuing armed struggle is that the opposition
camp has been weak in pursuing its political campaign. It is
illusionary to expect weak political campaigners to transform themselves
to strong armed campaigners. Others might call for new breed to take up
‘batons or sticks’ to find solution to our woes. But this is
short-sightedness. The phrase, ‘winning the war, but losing the peace’
is probably telling under this situation. To argue that simply removing
the PFDJ regime is a solution is naiveté.
It is important that
we learn from our past mistakes, and to use that as springboard to gain
the right momentum in establishing a viable nation. Instead of
advocating for alternative means to remove the regime, we should debate
how the political campaign can be made even more effective. The
significance of September 18th is that thousands of
Eritreans refused to kneel down to the regime and pursued political
campaigns to demand political reforms. This strategy is never a
mistake, and doesn’t need augmentation in the form of armed campaign to
achieve its objectives. As a result of the bravery of the fallen and
imprisoned heroes in their political campaign, the vast majority of
Eritreans and the whole world has shut down the regime. No one can
deny that PFDJ’s latest and increased acts of desperation are simply
reflections of the tightening noose around its neck. Imagine Mr.
Naizghi Kiflu waving the white flag! The regime is getting so
desperate to keep the insatiable army officer that it must now resort to
handing out ‘Pensiones’ [or mini-motels] from private businessmen and
giving it to them in its losing bid to keep them satisfied.
In politically
volatile situations like Eritrea, we will wake up one morning to find
that the ordinary people of Eritrea have forced the PFDJ plane down,
saying that we have had enough. Finally, we will have crossed the
bridge from armed struggle mentality of yesteryear to people’s movement
of the future of Eritrea. There is no such thing as shortcut to
achieving the most valuable and precious things in life.
It is interesting to
note that those furthest from the fire, from a safe distance, are the
ones advocating for adding fuel to the fire. It is understandable for
many of us to feel frustrated and helpless watching our fellow Eritreans
in Eritrea and in refugee camps suffer in their everyday life. For
us Eritreans, every one Eritrean that is wasted on the streets of
Asmara, in Wia, Sahara Desert, or the Mediterranean Sea is a piece of us
that is buried with him/her. But it is in adverse situations and
trying times, that we should remain focused. We should not lose sight
of our overall objective.
Opposition Camp’s
Weak Political Campaign
Among the various
articles written on the internet, it is difficult to find any kind of
analysis, suggestions, or recommendations on how to address the various
challenges faced within the opposition camp generally and specifically
EDA in any systematic manner. In previous article, I
had given three defining issues that EDA has failed to address.
In my opinion, EDA
has now failed on the fourth defining issue that I had mentioned in the
same article regarding the handling of EPM. The purpose of this
article is not to blame exclusively EDA, Adhanom’s EPM or Abdella’s EPM.
The most important
question the rest of us should ask is what should have been done to
resolve this conflict, esp. EDA vs. [dissenting] EPM. The question
should be what would have been done if properly working political
institutions were functioning. Instead, the internet is awash with
all kinds of comments or criticisms by writers who consider themselves
to be ‘insiders’ or ‘connected’. Many others base their comments on
what they know personally or in the grapevine about Mr. Adhanom, Mr.
Abdella, or Mr. Khalifa in the past rather than on facts based on this
particular situation only. This type of haphazard analysis will get us
nowhere in attempting to build tomorrow’s democratic Eritrea.
To reiterate, the
question should be what should EDA have done to address the EPM issue.
What do we mean by applying institutional-approach or systematic
conflict resolution mechanism to resolve the EDA-EPM issue? I don’t
believe that this line-of-reasoning is lost with our opposition
leadership, and within the opposition camp in general. It should not be
lost with us that structured way of engaging political campaigns will
take away much of the discretionary power that politicians, including
our opposition leaders, seek to attain and maintain. Politicians
are averse to openness as Dracula is to sunshine. Openness in our
political campaigns will raise questions, for instance, as to why
certain opposition groups are located in Addis Ababa, in a country that
maintains a formal ‘State of War’ against our country and against every
Eritrean – a very difficult one to answer indeed. When opposition
groups are uncomfortable with their own policies and actions, the
preferred method of political campaign is to close like a clam. But
this is self-defeating! It is not political campaign that is failing,
but the opposition politicians.
How should
dissenting members of EPM have presented their case?
As most of us don’t
have much information, we can only discuss in scenarios as to what the
dissenting members of EPM should have presented, i.e. if they haven’t
done so. First of all, EDA can’t dismiss the incumbent EPM
leaders just because dissenting members presented a petition.
EDA has no way of verifying that the dissenting members’ petition
represents the wishes of the majority of EPM members, nor for that
matter if petition can be viewed as legal instrument.
EDA must arrive
at its decision through legal reasoning, and not through political
decisions.
The rule-of-law should take precedence over politics every time. Thus,
it becomes incumbent on the dissenting EPM members to prove that
Mr. Abdella’s group no longer represent their organization. To prove
their claim, EPM’s dissenting members must convene a special meeting as
soon as possible, minding quorums and abiding by other organizational
laws to pass the necessary resolutions to remove their representatives
and leaders. Once such resolutions have been passed, it should then be
submitted to EDA as legal and binding decision of the majority of EPM’s
general membership (which may require 2/3 vote). Only once the
dissenting EPM members have fulfilled their organizational legal
requirements, they then can expect EDA to fulfill its legal obligations
in turn.
If EDA dismisses Mr.
Abdella’s group without any legal proof and verification, then EDA will
have violated the rule-of-law.
The two major
obstacles within the opposition camp in Diaspora are that members are
scattered over a long-distance making the convening of members on short
notice challenging. Second, due to the nature of the political
struggle, not many political organizations might be forthcoming in
divulging the size of their membership or, more specifically, to give
specific numbers in their claim of support from within the general
membership. Based on unconfirmed claims in one article, Mr.
Abdella’s group commands less than 50 members and Mr. Adhanom’s group
commands ‘ten times’ that number. But nothing is secret in Eritrean
politics and thus many have good ideas how many members each political
organization has.
If either or both
sides of the EPM divide is not willing to divulge the exact number of
its members, EDA can’t verify whether any legal claim by the dissenting
members is binding, thus EDA will find it difficult to decide. EDA
must base its decision on what is verifiable. If the size and wish
of the total EPM membership can’t be verified, EDA must decide on the
next most viable basis for its decision. In this case, the next most
verifiable of the legal status of the organization might be EPM’s
Central Committee. If Central Committee has been usurped by Mr.
Abdella’s group, the dissenting members should be able present documents
such as ‘Minutes’ to prove so.
The evidence
accumulation process will raise many legal and other questions and then
attempt to answer them in an objective manner.
How should EDA
have handled this conflict?
EDA has a greater
responsibility to handle this conflict in fair, transparent, and
systematic manner because it is a supra-organization. Its success or
failure to handle such defining issue might be foretelling
of what awaits post-PFDJ regime.
There is no reason
why EPM’s issue should be handled behind closed doors, especially if
EPM’s dissenting members are prepared to divulge organizational
information to resolve this issue.
In my opinion, the
most fair and proper way of handling this conflict would have been, [and
statements of the dissenting EPM members requests for official
investigation]
1.
EDA is correct in replacing Mr. Adhanom upon Mr. Abdella’s
request [as EDA has already done] and for Mr. Abdella to continue
representing EPM, unless the dissenting members have submitted legal
proof that they have convened special meeting removing Mr. Abdella and
other leaders. Mr. Abdella should continue to represent EPM until such
time as the dissenting members have shown legal proof to their claims.
EDA can’t infringe on Mr. Abdella’s rights without legal reasons.
2.
EDA should have set up an ad-hoc committee to review the
dissenters’ complaints, inform them in writing the course of action that
the dissenting EPM members must pursue for EDA to reconsider their
pleas. EDA should have stated in its communiqué that it would set-up an
ad-hoc committee to review the dissenting members complaints. EPM
Central Committee’s arguments contained in a letter sent to EDA should
not have been included in EDA’s communiqué [2nd point]
because doing so may also require EDA to include the dissenting members
arguments. In other words, EDA can’t present only one side of the
argument. It should be either a full report of the various arguments or
simply a very general communiqué. In addition, including the second
point in EDA’s communiqué that EPM’s leadership considers the dissent as
internal issue, implies that this was a major factor in arriving at
EDA’s decision. But this argument can’t be a basis for decision because
ultimately EDA must determine who is the legal representative of EPM.
Mr. Abdella might be a legal representative today, what about in couple
of weeks, or few weeks after EPM’s special grassroots meeting [if it
takes place] removing him and CC. The fourth point in EDA’s communiqué
suggests that Mr. Adhanom’s group is a minority, or the split-offs.
This fourth point in the EDA communiqué has finality to it. This is
a haphazard way of communicating EDA’s decision.
3.
In the meantime, EDA should have refrained from taking a final
decision unless it has already undertaken all the necessary formal
investigations. The dissenting members must have the right to appeal.
If EDA has done formal investigation, then the nature or even the
details of the investigation and the basis of decision should be made
public.
4.
At the next EDA meeting, the ad-hoc committee would present its
findings and the EDA leadership decides on the matter after debating the
official committee report.
5.
After such decision, EDA would make available to the public the
committee report and the leadership decision.
We should operate
the opposition camp as if we are in post-PFDJ Eritrea. In this
scenario, probably the dissenting members would have gotten an
injunction against Mr. Abdella in the court of law. But in Diaspora
politics, there is no recourse in court of law, and thus decision
becomes all political. That is why, EDA must have other dispute
resolution mechanisms that mirrors the judiciary body, at least some
kind of technical bodies to function as such. Others all our decisions
will be based on poor and biased political decisions that only weakens
the resolve of even the dedicated members of the opposition, while
feeding the frenzy of rumor machines.
Not everybody might
be happy with the outcome of an open and systematic decision. But
nobody would question the fairness of the process. In addition, the
public would be spared any kind of speculation. We would all base our
decisions on facts. Instead of blaming the general public of engaging
in rumor-mongering and idle speculation, let the people decide based on
such facts available to it.
This is the only way
to build consensus!
This is the only way
to foster institutions!
This is the only
legacy we can leave for the younger generation – openness/transparency,
systematic, and fairness in our dealings.
We will never
agree on many issues or on how to handle them. But we should never
question each other’s fairness in our dealings. If we begin to question
our fairness, we have lost everything else.
EDA must make every
effort to keep and address committed members concerns before attracting
new members into the opposition camp. As long as EDA engages in
transparent and fair decision-making process, even the dissenters would,
with some disappointment but respectfully, have accepted EDA’s decision.
I see no
justification for behind-the-door decisions, especially in context of a
political campaign to remove the regime and, just as important, to
establish stable and democratic Eritrea. Many consider political
campaign as ‘Soap Opera’.
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‘Do
you know what he did to undermine his colleagues?’
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‘What,
tell me, what, what …?’
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‘Gotta
buy me some drinks because it is a long story …’
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‘We
have eight hours and don’t worry about the drinks.’
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‘You
think it started in the Kassel Festival, no, no, my bosom buddy, it
started way back in 1968, when he and the other guy had weird dream that
their ideas will …’
So continues the
idle chats instead of rolling up our sleeves to discuss facts on
pertinent and relevant issues of the day. Where facts are lacking, we
should ask ourselves how we can ensure facts are available for everybody
to make informed decisions. If we allow facts to remain buried, if we
don’t put pressure on our opposition leaders to abide by the
rule-of-law, code-of-conduct, accountability, and transparency, then how
do we expect for Eritrea to develop into viable and stable democratic
nation?
Some may argue that
the nature of the current opposition politics in Diaspora is not
conducive for the rule-of-law, code-of-conduct, accountability, and
transparency. This is total hogwash! There are always excuses why a
regime or an organization must digress from abiding by democratic
principles. There are always ‘difficult’ situations, ‘national
security’, ‘sensitive issues’, etc… for justifying to deviate from the
path of democratic principles. But, the danger is always in secrecy
rather than in transparency. The opposition in Diaspora has far
less issues to deal with than a government with zillion other challenges
and issues. That is why, the opposition in Diaspora has no excuse to
deviate from practicing systematic and transparent way of addressing the
various issues. Transparency requires strong public relations.
One more advantage
of systematic manner of addressing issues is that we can learn from
it. Ad-hoc committees should be made up of fully qualified
individuals, and their reports should be professionally prepared. It
should be made public because of two reasons. First, and again, the
public will be able to formulate their views based on facts. Second,
and very important, is that qualified individuals are not without
biases. If these qualified individuals are made aware that the report
will be made public, they will tone down their biases. The committee
report will then be used for future reference in guiding us to improve
our organizations. By failing to document our experiences [through
official investigations] we are bound to repeat the same mistakes. The
same ELF/EPLF, ELF/ELF, EPLF/EPLF, ENA/EDA, RC/NC, EDP/EPM, EPM/EPM,
etc… will just become a fact of Eritrean politics without learning
anything from these experiences. We remain the unlearning
organizations, esp. those of us in Diaspora who should know better
with so much exposure.
We have significant
challenges in our political campaigns. Many are paying dearly for it.
Let us not lose these lessons. Time to change is way past due!
Congratulations
Zeresanay! We are proud of you!
Congratulations
Meskerem.net for the virtual conference! Eritrean private media are
showing once again their industriousness, as lamented by the Ethiopian
government in 98/99, and later by the PFDJ regime. My hats off!
Berhan Hagos
September 21, 2005
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