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Did You Know This?– 3
Ethnic Conflict in the Horn
of Africa: Myth and Reality
By
Hizkias
Assefa
(Material Disseminated by the UN
University)
Nharnet Team (Feb 13, 2005)
The United Nations University, UNU, is an organ of the
UN established by the General Assembly in 1972 to be an international
community of multicultural scholars engaged in research and
dissemination of knowledge. Nharnet.com is pleased to present to
its readers selected articles from UNU’s research papers of 1996 on
governance and conflict resolution. In the interesting research paper
below, sponsored by the UN University and published in 1996, the
Ethiopian writer H. Assefa gives a picture of ethnic conflicts in the
Horn of Africa by expounding on the following issues:
·
“...what
has been called ethnic conflict is elite-driven conflict. When one talks
of ethnic conflict between the Amhara and the Tigre in Ethiopia, or the
Arabs and the Africans in the Sudan, for example, it is more accurate to
talk about conflict between elite groups who come from different ethnic
backgrounds than about people-to-people violence among the masses
arising from ethnic animosity, as the term "ethnic conflict" implies.
However, such an elite-driven conflict has a powerful capability of
turning into widespread conflict among the masses.”
·
The concept of
"self-determination" is so riddled with
confusion that it does not provide a viable alternative. The term itself
is composed of two concepts, "self" and "determination," whose
definition and operation raise a multitude of problems. What constitutes
the "self"? Is it a group that is connected by primordial ties like an
ethnic group? Could any other group form the "self"? Can the "self" be
engineered? And what is the meaning, implication, and scope of the term
"determination"?
·
“Could we say
that the lowland Beni-Amer and Beja Muslims in Eritrea, who constitute
a large percentage of the Eritrean population, and who are different
peoples from the Christian highland Tigreans, have a right to
self-determination and to a separate state? Where does the
disintegration stop? Does it continue until we get to an area occupied
by one pure ethnic group? Is that possible? Is it desirable?..”
·
“....analysis of
‘inequitable economic and class stratification’ or ‘monopolization of
access to state and economic power by an ethnic based elite’ might
provide an equally sound if not better explanation of the conflicts in
the region.”
Nharnet Team wishes
you good reading of the research work below divided on the following
sub-headings:
Introduction
Conceptual problems
Problems of definition
Ethnicity and social harmony
The role of ideology
Traditional remedies
An alternative approach
Conclusion
Introduction
Most of the wars waged in the Horn of Africa during
the past 30 years have been described in terms of ethnic conflict, both
by the adversaries themselves and by external analysts. The first and
second Sudan civil wars have been characterized as conflicts between the
Arabized northerners and African southerners, with cleavages along
religious, racial, cultural, and linguistic lines. The various civil
wars in Ethiopia have been characterized as wars between the Amharas and
the Tigreans, Oromos, Eritreans, and so on. The Somali conflicts have
been described as conflicts between the Maraheens and the Isaaqs, or
between the Darods and the Ogadenis, and so on; and the conflict in
Djibouti as between the Afars and the Issas.
Although each of these wars has been termed "ethnic
conflict", one encounters tremendous difficulty when trying to analyse
what is meant by this term and what these conflicts have been about. In
this chapter some of the problems associated with the concept of
ethnicity and ethnic conflict as they apply to the Horn of Africa will
be examined. A discussion will follow of various mechanisms that have
been utilized or advocated in the region to remedy the problem of ethnic
conflict. The chapter will conclude with remarks on some possible
responses that might open ways for the transformation and hopefully the
alleviation of the problem.
Conceptual problems
What are some of the difficulties with using the
concept of ethnicity as a framework for understanding and addressing the
conflicts in the Horn of Africa? First, it is not clear what is meant by
the terms "ethnic group," "ethnicity," and "ethnic conflict." In the
context of the Horn, many concepts, such as nationality, tribe, and now
clan, have been used interchangeably with that of ethnic group, and it
is very difficult to distinguish between them. A commonly used
definition is that an ethnic group is a collectivity of people who share
the same primordial characteristics such as common ancestry, language,
and culture. (People have included religion in the category of shared
culture.) Ethnicity then refers to the behaviour and feeling (about
oneself and others) that supposedly emanates from membership of an
ethnic group. Ethnic conflict has come to mean cleavages between
groups based on differentiations in ethnic identities.
A major question that arises from the above
definition of "ethnic group" is whether people must share commonalties
in all the criteria mentioned to be members of the same ethnic group or
to share the same ethnicity. There are instances in the Horn in which
just belonging to the same religion seems to suffice to classify people
as members of an ethnic group, although they might differ in other
criteria. For example, in central and southern Ethiopia, if an Oromo is
Orthodox Christian that individual may be classified as an Amhara
regardless of his or her ethnic ancestry or lineage.1 In
other instances, as in the Oromo regions, language has been used as the
criterion for determining membership, despite other differences. But
there are also cases where commonality in language and religion has not
signified membership of the same ethnic group. Especially where groups
have interacted for a long time, there are situations where people might
have overlaps in one of these ethnic criteria (religion, language,
culture, or ancestry) but lack commonalties in the rest. How are people
to be ethnically classified under those circumstances?
Some have argued that membership of an ethnic group
is not determined by objective factors such as sharing common primordial
characteristics. They point to subjective factors such as perception,
belonging, self-identification, and the like (Hymes, 1968:1220; Nadel,
1947: 13). They argue that a person, regardless of primordial
commonalities, can become a member of an ethnic group if he or she feels
and acts as a member and is accepted as such by the group. But this
raises some problems. If the basis for the perceived commonality or
belonging is not the primordial common factor, then what is it? Could
the basis be commonalities in interests, aspirations, psychological
orientations? If so, why should this kind of identity and bond be
characterized as "ethnic"? Moreover, what happens in cases where some
feel and act as if they are members but their membership is not accepted
by the reference group?
In short, the definition of ethnic groups and the
distinction between people based on ethnic criteria is difficult,
inconsistent, and confusing. One could come up with different results
depending on whether one uses objective or subjective criteria. This has
led to great controversy concerning the identification and measurement
of the phenomenon.2 But the preoccupation with definition is
not simply an academic exercise. It has very important practical
implications. It should go without saying that we cannot develop
effective mechanisms to deal with a problem if we do not fully
understand it. Frustration with the inability fully to grasp and define
the concept of ethnicity has led to a tendency which says: "Let us not
waste a great deal of time trying to define the concept; instead let us
recognize it as a major problem and put our energies into developing
mechanisms to deal with it."
Some would take the approach used by a US Supreme
Court justice to define pornography: you may not be able to define it,
but you know it when you see it. The trouble with that attitude is that
if we are not agreed on what the phenomenon is we might be wasting our
energy by focusing on the wrong problems or by prescribing a remedy for
a problem that has not been diagnosed correctly. As we will see in
greater detail later, doing so could even run the risk of making the
situation worse instead of remedying it.
Another difficulty with the concept of ethnicity and
ethnic conflict is the common assumption that ethnic similarities and
differences are the basis for social harmony or discord. Thus, it is
expected that those who share a common ancestry, language, culture, and
religion should have a relationship of solidarity and harmony with each
other but one of cleavage and conflict with those who do not share their
ethnic identity. This concept is also full of problems. There are
societies in the Horn where ethnic similarity has not assured social
harmony nor avoided the outbreak of large-scale conflict. Especially
where there is no perception of external threat, there is a great deal
of evidence that ethnic groups have divided into lower-level identities
and fought each other with as much zeal as they might fight other ethnic
groups. Alternatively, there are also societies in the region where
ethnic diversity has not been a prescription for violent conflicts.
These problems can be illustrated by examples from
various contexts in the Horn of Africa. As indicated earlier, in
Ethiopia ethnicity has been identified by many as a major cause of
conflict. That country's major civil wars were between the central
government, which was seen to have been dominated by the Amhara people,
and various insurgency groups bearing the names of ethnic groups such as
the Oromo, Tigre, Afar, Ogaden, and Beni-Amer Liberation Fronts. The
liberation fronts claimed they were fighting to break free of the
political, economic, social, cultural, and religious domination of the
Amhara people over their particular ethnic groups.
Problems of definition
Once one goes beyond the labels and begins to
decipher the claims and counter-claims in the Ethiopian conflicts, all
the problems associated with the concept of ethnicity discussed earlier
begin to surface. To begin with, the definition of the "oppressors" and
the "oppressed" in ethnic terms becomes an insurmountable task. Who are
the dominating Amhara people? How is membership in this group defined?
What is the Amhara culture? Is "Amhara domination" a code word that
disguises other grievances or does it signify supremacy of one
population over another, as the term implies?
It is true that most of the symbols of the Ethiopian
state (official religion, official language, etc.) have taken the
identity of what has been labelled "Amhara culture," and the persons who
have occupied power and privilege have, by and large, borne Amhara
names. But this situation does not mean that the great majority of the
Amhara people have been "dominators" or beneficiaries of the political,
economic, or social system that bore their name.
First of all, not all people that speak Amharic as
their mother tongue and are Orthodox Christians consider themselves as
one ethnic group. The Gondare Amharas are distinct from the Shoan
Amharas, as the Gojam Amharas are from the Wollo Amharas. There had been
a history of rivalry and warfare between these subgroups. In the past
several centuries, the subgroups had formed various alliances with other
ethnic groups such as the Oromos, the Gurages, and the Tigres to fight
other Amharas. The same phenomenon of internal division and warfare has
also prevailed among other groups such as the Oromos, the Afares, and
the Somalis.
Second, in the last century, the major beneficiaries
of the "Amhara dominated" state were primarily the Shoans, who held most
of the government leadership positions, controlled much economic power,
governed most of the provinces, owned large estates in the southern
provinces, and managed to make Shoa's capital, Addis Ababa, the centre
of economic activity for the entire Ethiopian state. The other Amharas (Wolloyes,
Gojames, and Gondares) were excluded from this system as much as those
who belonged to other ethnic groups.
Third, even with "Shoan domination," the
beneficiaries of such privilege were the aristocracy and the educated
elite, who constituted a very tiny percentage of the Amhara population.
The vast majority of the Shoan Amharas have been as poor, powerless, and
exploited as any other Amhara or non-Amhara groups such as the Oromos,
Gurages, or Sidamas. In fact, the poverty of the Shoan Amhara peasant
was in some cases worse than that of the "subjugated peoples" of
southern Ethiopia such as the Kaffa and Adere people, who were
"outsiders" to the state system.
Fourth, even the ethnic identity of the Shoan rulers
has been subject to controversy. As far back as the 1760s, Oromos have
assumed very significant leadership roles in the Abyssinian kingdoms or
empires based in Shoa and the other Amhara regions of Begemder, Gojam,
and Wollo. According to Clapham (1988/9: 217), the Shoan leaders have
been as much Oromo and Gurage as Amhara. He points out that most of the
Shoan emperors, and many of the generals and governors who served these
rulers in the expansion of Shoan control to the south of the country,
had Oromo or Gurage lineage. Emperor Haile Sellassie, the latest and one
of the strongest symbols of "Amhara domination," was "in terms of his
parentage more Oromo than Amhara, and also had a Gurage grandmother. He
married an Oromo."4
Fifth, there is a big question as to whether the
so-called Amhara culture was merely the culture of one ethnic group
which was imposed on other ethnic groups. It has been pointed out that
the Amhara culture interacted with the cultures of other peoples in
Ethiopia not by assimilation but rather by acculturation.5
Although its name stayed "Amhara," the culture allowed others to
influence and change it. Asmeron Legesse (1973: 9) argues that "the
process of cultural exchange cannot be reduced to a simplistic picture
in which Gallinna [Oromo] speakers [for example] become Amhara... It is
a rather complex situation in which many cultural vectors are
interacting to produce a resultant [sic] that is fundamentally new."
This aspect of the so-called Amhara culture has enabled Clapham (1988:
23-4) to call it a core element of a multi-ethnic culture which, despite
its name, is not the exclusive property of any particular group of
people.
In sum, Greenfield (1965: 58) scans the history of
the Ethiopian peoples' interaction over the centuries and observes:
"This latter word [Amhara] no longer has close definition and it is
clear that the word 'tribalism' is not suited to Ethiopian studies."
Thus, we find the ethnic explanation of the conflict
that has gripped Ethiopia for the past 30 years, such as the theory of "Amhara
domination," very inadequate and misleading. This is partly because it
is very difficult to define the actors in ethnic terms (for instance,
who are the Amharas?). Secondly, even if it were possible to define the
actors in ethnic terms (if one were to define easily who the Amharas
were), the reality on the ground does not support a conclusion that what
was witnessed in Ethiopia was ethnic conflict.
In fact, a good case can be made that ethnic
conflict, in the sense of one ethnic group waging a war against another,
or pogroms motivated by ethnic hatred, such as we have seen in some
societies, has been a very rare event in the history of Ethiopia. The
norm in the country, if not in the region, with the exception of recent
developments in Somalia, has been ethnic coexistence rather than ethnic
warfare.
Ethnicity and social harmony
Now let us look at the other problem with the
ethnicity framework the assumption that ethnic similarity or difference
is the basis for social harmony or cleavage respectively. When we
examine this assumption in the context of the Horn, we find that it is
also full of difficulties.
Not long ago Somalia was the envy of many African
states because it was one of the very few nation states that existed in
the continent. It was a territory inhabited by people who shared the
same ancestral origin, language, religion, and culture - all the
elements of common ethnicity. But that ethnic or nationality bond was
not strong enough to prevent disintegration. Currently an extremely
bloody civil war is being waged between clans and sub-clans. In the
capital, Mogadishu, alone, over 30,000 Somalis have been killed in the
past two years from inter-clan clashes. Hundreds of thousands have been
made refugees. Interestingly, some analysts have begun to describe the
clan conflict as ethnic or tribal conflict. If the term "ethnic
conflict" is being used synonymously with "clan conflict," could it also
be used to mean conflict between sub-clans or between family groups? If
so, how useful is a term that could mean so many different things in
different contexts?
When we look at the Eritrean/Ethiopian conflict,
however, we observe the opposite configuration. Some of the major
justifications given for the independence of Eritrea from Ethiopia have
been that the Eritrean people are different from Ethiopians; that
Ethiopia itself is not a legitimate nation state since it is a
conglomeration of very diverse peoples; and that, as a separate people,
Eritreans have a right to exercise their right of self-determination.
But when one examines Eritrea itself, one sees that it is also an entity
composed of nine major ethnic groups, having nine different languages
and cultures. The population is divided into two major religions
(Christianity and Islam) and two ecosystems (highland and lowland) which
more or less correspond with the religious divisions. If we pursue the
logic for Eritrean separation, could we say that the lowland Beni-Amer
and Beja Muslims in Eritrea, who are different peoples from the
Christian highland Tigreans, and who constitute a large percentage of
the Eritrean population, have a right to self-determination and to a
separate state? Where does the disintegration stop? Does it continue
until we get to an area occupied by one pure ethnic group? Is that
possible? Is it desirable? As indicated earlier, there are always
cultural, linguistic, ancestral, and religious continuities between
ethnic groups that have interacted with each other for long periods. How
will it be possible to separate groups from each other without wrenching
apart families and communities, and without provoking hostilities
between the groups?
Alternatively, if such diverse ethnic groups could
come together in Eritrea and form a nation, why shouldn't the same logic
apply to the rest of Ethiopia? Do Eritreans believe that all these
diverse people will make one nation, or is this just wishful thinking?
Is it ethnic similarity in Eritrea that created a sense of common
antipathy towards the Ethiopian state, or is it the oppression Eritreans
commonly experienced from the economic and political system imposed on
them by the élites who controlled the Ethiopian state (which, by the
way, also included Eritreans)? If so, is the remedy to the problem the
removal of the oppressive system or is it separation and the creation of
a new state?
Our analysis so far reveals some major problems with
the concept of ethnicity as a framework for analysing the conflicts in
the Horn of Africa. Is this framework helpful? Does focusing on the
ethnic differences or similarities of people in the region give us a
good understanding of the conflicts or of what needs to be done to
contain them? Could there be other explanations that would capture these
situations better?
Clapham (1990: 10) argues: "Viewed across the region
as a whole, economic marginalisation provides a much clearer guide than
either ethnicity or even political exclusion to the incidence of warfare
in the Horn." On a more cautionary note, Bhardwaj argues:
The importance of the ethnic factor [in the Horn of
Africa] is recognised by all. But it is our contention that, along with
the role of the ethnic actors, the socio-economic basis of the ethnic
hostility must also be given due weight. A clash of interest of the
exploiters belonging to different ethnic groups and the masses in
general precipitates the ethnic hostility. The struggle of the nomads
of Ogaden and Tigre of lower Eritrea against the Amharas of the
Ethiopian plateau - all bring ethnic differences to the fore and distort
a basically socio-economic conflict into an ethnic one. (Bhardwaj,
1979: 169)
It can be argued that, to a large extent, what has
been called ethnic conflict is elite-driven conflict. When one talks of
ethnic conflict between the Amhara and the Tigre in Ethiopia, or the
Arabs and the Africans in the Sudan, for example, it is more accurate to
talk about conflict between elite groups who come from different ethnic
backgrounds than about people-to-people violence among the masses
arising from ethnic animosity, as the term "ethnic conflict" implies.
However, such an elite-driven conflict has a powerful capability of
turning into widespread conflict among the masses.
It is true that the region's ethnic groups have their
own prejudices and stereotypes about each other. But these attitudes
have not normally turned into conflict at the people-to-people level
unless manipulated and organized by political leaders. Élites find
ethnic prejudices and stereotypes fertile ground in which they can
easily cultivate support for their political and economic aspirations.
Expressing their objectives in ethnic or nationality terms (such as
"advancing the interest of our own people" or "protecting ourselves from
another ethnic group") ennobles the pursuits and gives them more
legitimacy.
As we have seen in many instances in the continent,
the major beneficiaries of such aspirations might be the élites, but the
whole ethnic group becomes associated with these aims since they are
pursued in the name of the entire group.
Once this cycle starts and conflict begins to be
waged in the group's name, fear and further animosity pervade the whole
group, since all members become perceived as the enemy by those against
whom the conflict is being waged. Pre-existing ethnic prejudices further
fuel the conflict because they simplify the complex motivations of the
actors, making it easy to create an immediate "us" and "them" perception
as well as to demonize the adversary.
Thus, a conflict started by the élites ends up, in a self-fulfilling
prophecy, engulfing the entire ethnic group. Interestingly, despite such
efforts by élites, at least in the Horn of Africa, the incidence of
people-to-people violence and pogroms has been quite rare.
Despite the confusion generated by the concept of
ethnic conflict, many analysts have latched on to this simplistic
concept, implying people-to-people antagonisms based on ethnic
differences to describe the conflicts in the region. As Clapham and
Bharwaj have indicated, analysis of "inequitable economic and class
stratification" or "monopolization of access to state and economic power
by an ethnic based elite" (in the case of Ethiopia, a multiethnic elite
under the name of Amhara oligarchy) might provide an equally sound if
not better explanation of the conflicts in the region.
The role of ideology
In the case of Ethiopia, particularly in the past 20
years, ideology has also played a role in sustaining and exacerbating
the notion that ethnic animosity and supremacy of one people over the
other is at the root of the conflicts in the country. The radical
student movement of the 1960s and the early '70s, which was the
forerunner of the 1974 Ethiopian revolution, was strongly
Marxist-Leninist in orientation. During the rise of this movement,
Lenin's discourse on "the nationalities question" and his prescription
of "self-determination up to secession" (along with other Marxist ideas
of "dictatorship of the proletariat," "collectivization of agriculture,"
etc.) were lifted wholesale from the history of the Soviet Union and
grafted onto Ethiopian realities, thereby forming a major tenet in the
political discussions at that time. There was not much debate about
these concepts' relevance to the Ethiopian situation or about the
operational problems involved in implementing them. Although the term
"nationalities issue" grated on many people's ears, they acquiesced to
it, since it was the paradigm of the day.
After the 1974 revolution, the soldiers who took
power from the monarchy did not have much knowledge or experience of how
to restructure the society following the destruction of the old social
order. The radical Marxist student leaders were brought into the
government, where they became the revolution's advisers and ideological
leaders. Those student leaders then had the opportunity to make the
"nationalities question" a national agenda. According to Markakis:
As militant Marxists, the radicals [student leaders]
were obliged to confront the national issue and, after some agonising,
they opted for the Leninist principle of national self-determination and
declared their support for the Eritrean rebels... From then on, the
national issue was forced on the agenda of every political movement in
the country... Since it [the government of Mengistu Haile Mariam]
espoused Marxism as its ideology, the new regime could not formally
reject the principle of national self-determination. (Markakis, 1989:
4-6)
Even after Mengistu's overthrow in 1991, the new
government leaders were those who had been socialized in the radical
Marxist Leninist ideology of the 1960s and who still held entrenched
views on the nationalities issue. As soon as they took power they
declared that the most important issue facing the country was the
"nationalities question," and proceeded to decree that all ethnic
groups, nationalities, and peoples in the country could define their own
territory, form their own governments, and exercise self-determination,
including declaring independence.6 Towards this objective,
the map of the country was redrawn, eliminating the old multi-ethnic
administrative provinces of the country and replacing them with ethnic
zones. As demarcating boundaries based on ethnicity is never an easy
task in Ethiopia, the new map has reportedly been redrawn at least twice
already.
The fallout from this policy has already started.
People have been forced out of land they have inhabited for generations
and told to return to their ethnic homelands. Of course, there is no
home awaiting them in their places of origin, for they migrated
generations ago. In some areas violent conflict has broken out between
members of different ethnic groups in attempts to draw their own ethnic
boundaries or claim territories that were considered common in the past.
Ethnic claims over resources that were considered
common, such as minerals, land, ports, etc., are likely to become very
explosive issues.
In the 30 years prior to the demise of Mengistu's
regime, the civil wars in the country were waged between the central
government and insurgencies bearing ethnic names. But in the current
situation people are being pitted against each other. Neighbours who
have coexisted peacefully for decades, if not centuries, are being
encouraged by official government policy to emphasize their ethnic
differences so that ethnically homogeneous political structures can be
created. Age-old relationships between peoples, intermarriages, cultural
interactions and continuities, are in peril of being disrupted or
wrenched apart. As the reality in the country has been a long history of
coexistence and cooperation between ethnic groups at the grass roots,
people are speaking out against the ethnic segregation that is being
imposed on them from the top. However, unless the implications of this
new ethnic policy are examined carefully and the policy itself revised,
the government might end up creating more ethnic conflict than it
deters.
Close observation of the Ethiopian situation makes
one wonder whether the preoccupation with "the nationalities question"
and its prescribed remedy of "national self-determination" are products
of an ideological framework rather than an outgrowth of the country's
realities. Instead of the reality on the ground determining the model of
theoretical framework to be used in diagnosing, understanding, and
dealing with it, an ideologically dictated theoretical framework seems
to have been imposed on the reality, which is then forced to conform
with the framework. As the saying goes, if the only tool you have is a
hammer, then you think everything else is a nail.
Similarly, since the most dominant analytical
framework in Ethiopian politics since the late 1960s was the ethnic
framework, it seems that every problem in the country was viewed as
emanating from this basic question. Class analysis, elite exploitation,
or even regionalism would have gone a long way to explain the country's
situation, rather than an exclusive focus on ethnicity and the
nationalities issue. If those other frameworks had been used, the
emergent remedies would have differed from the current proposed
solutions, which could drag the country into another cycle of bitter
civil war.
This is not to argue that political leaders invented
the nationalities problem in Ethiopia. There is no question, however,
that they distorted it, inflated it out of proportion, and exploited it.7
Ethnicity all of a sudden became the predominant explanation of many of
the things that went wrong in the society. Élites sold the idea to the
people and now the people are carrying the banner. A myth is developing
that the creation of new states will solve the problems people have
experienced with the current state systems in the region.
Traditional remedies
Now, if we focus on the solutions that have been
traditionally applied to the problem of ethnicity and the conflicts it
generates, we notice that the remedies seem to present as many
difficulties as the problem itself. The traditional responses have been
either "nation-building," which has meant forging one nation out of
diverse peoples, or, in rare cases, "self-determination," which in many
people's minds has been associated with separation and the formation of
another state.
Attempts at building new nation states out of a
multitude of ethnic groups has generally taken two forms. One has been
the creation of a multi-ethnic culture, which all groups identify with
and voluntarily adopt as their own. The other is the assimilation of
different cultures into a dominant one, usually by the direction of a
highly centralized and coercive state. The first approach is complicated
and normally takes a long time to develop. The second approach,
seemingly expedient, has been adopted by many post-colonial African
states in their eagerness to generate quick results. But this approach
has often been associated with manipulation and at times outright
repression by those in power. The 30 years of experience with this
approach since independence has shown that not many new nation states
have been forged in Africa. In fact, it might be said that the efforts
made in this direction seem to have backfired. More recently, animosity
and violence along ethnic lines has been on the increase in many African
societies, especially as the highly centralized nature of these states
is being challenged with the movement towards multi-party politics.
As another response to ethnic conflict, people have
proposed "self determination" as an alternative to "nation-building."
But the concept of "self-determination" is so riddled with confusion
that it does not provide a viable alternative. The term itself is
composed of two concepts, "self" and "determination," whose definition
and operation raise a multitude of problems. What constitutes the
"self"? Is it a group that is connected by primordial ties like an
ethnic group? Could any other group form the "self"? Can the "self" be
engineered? And what is the meaning, implication, and scope of the term
"determination"?
If the "self" were to refer to a group having
primordial ties, we are again faced with all the problems discussed
earlier regarding group definition, especially in cases of a long
history of inter-group interaction. The distinction between objective
and subjective criteria again becomes an issue. Mayall argues that it is
not clear whether some of these aggregate identities like nations exist
"as an objective reality, as claimed by nationalists, or should be
understood as an imagined community or creative fictions as others have
claimed" (Mayall, 1990: 2; see also Gellner, 1983).
If one uses the objective criterion of primordial
ties for defining nations, then there are many who feel that their
primordial roots do not solely dictate their interests, needs,
aspirations, and ability to forge common purpose as well as affiliations
with those who do not come from the same roots. If one uses the
subjective criterion - and there is a lot of merit to that - a major
problem becomes how to identify those who feel they belong to an ethnic
group so that they are clustered in one territory? What if those who
feel they belong are not accepted by others as belonging?
To the extent that self-determination has meant
separation and creation of a state, how might it be possible to build a
state around an ethnic group without provoking chauvinism, ethnic
animosity, and the wrenching apart of communities, given the cultural,
linguistic, ancestral, and religious continuities between ethnic groups
that have interacted with each other for long periods? The search for
the pure ethnic group as a foundation for building a state has led to
fascism, Nazism, pogroms, massive dislocations, and genocide's in many
parts of the world, including the African continent itself.
If, on the other hand, the "self" refers to an
"imagined community" or "creative fiction," as Mayall argues, could one
then stretch one's imagination to include others in the community so
that "the self" becomes a larger and more inclusive unit?
Aside from the definition of the "self," there is
still a problem with the content of "self-determination." What is to be
determined? What is the scope of the "determination"? Some have defined
self-determination as the aspiration "to have control over one's affairs
in order to ensure one's economic and social well-being" (An-Na'im,
1989: 21; see also Assefa, forthcoming (a)). But the ability to
determine one's own affairs or economic and social well-being is
increasingly being complicated by the realities of an interdependent
world. One is constrained not only by one's own capabilities but the
interests and capabilities of others. Except in a world of autarky or
complete isolation, any actor must recognize how his or her needs and
actions are compatible with those of others in the system. The more
interdependent the world becomes, as the trend seems to indicate, the
more one's orientation might need to be towards coalition-building,
coordination, negotiation, and consensus rather than unilateral
determination of one's own affairs. If so, how much autonomous control
can one sensibly exercise in this modern and rapidly shrinking world?
How meaningful is it to absolutize "self-determination" in such
circumstances?
The major limitation in all of these approaches to
defining the "self" for the purposes of "self-determination" is the
failure to recognize that primordial elements constitute only one
consideration in that definition. It cannot be denied that there are
other considerations based on human choice rather than mere coincidence
of birth. Common perceptions, needs, aspirations, and interests can also
enable people to include others who share these sentiments in their
definition of "themselves" even if they do not share primordial links
with them. Therefore, to define the "self" exclusively in terms of
primordial givens by creating ethnic states seems to ignore,
artificially and detrimentally, the various dimensions that enter into
people's definition of themselves. The challenge becomes how to
recognize and legitimize the unavoidable and undeniable fact of
primordial roots, but to temper its detrimental and exclusionary
tendencies by encouraging broader definitions that can accommodate
others. In other words, how might it be possible to encourage and
emphasize the consociational aspect of "self"-definition as much as the
primordial aspects?
An alternative approach
The two conflicting demands of "nation-building" and
"self-determination" have embroiled the Horn, as well as much of the
African continent, in decades of bloodshed and destruction. However, we
have seen that both approaches suffer from severe limitations which
prevent them from providing avenues for the effective creation of
harmonious societies.
Given these limitations, a more promising direction,
especially in the case of Ethiopia, might be to re-examine the notion
that ethnic animosity and the domination of one ethnic group by another
are the causes of the conflicts in the country and that the solutions to
these conflicts lies in secession or the creation of independent states.
Instead, addressing the economic and political
inequities in the system (which no doubt had been disguised and confused
by ethnic labels), enlarging the economic base so that there are
resources to share among various ethnic groups, opening up the political
system so that everyone, regardless of his or her ethnic background, can
have access to it, as well as creating a system of governance that is
democratic and respects the political and human rights of all citizens,
could go a very long way towards remedying the so-called "ethnic"
conflicts in Ethiopia.
In conjunction with this, one should work at
developing systems that could prevent ethnicity from becoming a cause
for further cleavages and civil war in the various societies of the
Horn. First, it must be established that the question of identity is not
and should not be a zero-sum issue in human relationships. All people
have multiple identities which are expressed differently in different
circumstances. The freedom of an individual or a group to choose its own
separate identity should not, therefore, be a threat to others as long
as that individual or group also recognizes that there is common
identity at another level with those from whom it is distinguishing
itself. Thus, as much as people endeavor to articulate and enhance what
is unique about themselves, an equal amount of energy should be invested
in articulating and enhancing what binds them with other people.
A mechanism must be found to legitimize ethnic
identity in the Horn of Africa without making it incompatible with the
formation of a larger unit of identity based on mutuality and beneficial
collaboration. A promising endeavor in this context might be to adopt a
very loose federal system of governance supplemented by building
infrastructures for regional integration. The loose federal system of
governance would allow for the expression of ethnic identity. But the
tendency towards fragmentation that might arise from legitimizing
ethnicity would be balanced and tempered by providing incentives towards
higher levels of integration and identification with the entire region.
As the various ethnic groups become reassured of their identity and
security, they would also be provided with incentives for a larger
regional identity by highlighting the benefits that could emerge from
higher levels of association and integration.
The fear and resentment which groups have of the
current state systems in the region, as well as their tendency to view
separation as a solution, can be tempered if the state is viewed as an
intermediate institution rather than the institution of final resort to
work out problems, as it has been to date. The creation of a supra-state
regional structure, in which the various groups in the region have a say
but which is capable of dealing with problems that cannot be dealt with
at the state level, could have a salutary effect on the conflicts
between the state and the various groupings within it.
This approach could enable the societies in the Horn
to work at both ends of the identity problem. While people would be
reassured about being what they are or cannot avoid being, they would
also be encouraged to explore greater vistas of meaningful identity with
greater entities, beyond the state. The disintegration and exclusive
orientation of ethnicity would become more balanced by the synthesis and
inclusiveness that comes from a sense of regional identity. Creating a
regional framework with a move towards regional integration could permit
the relaxation of strict boundary demarcations, allowing freedom of
movement and interaction between peoples. It could reduce the pressure
for the creation of new independent states by disaffected groups, since
there would be a new regional forum to redress their grievances or
address their interests and rights without their being forced to resort
to secession.
The concept of a regional identity arising from a
vision of regional integration could create a less threatening,
consociational process where all the actors in the region could be
engaged in building a more equitable and peaceful social contract that
could lead to mutually enriching relation ships.8 Regional
identity would not be an end in itself, but a step in a transition to
more inclusive identities. It would challenge groups to recognize
aspects of themselves that could they could share beyond the ethnic
group and the satate.9
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