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Did You Know This? – 14
Democratic Constitution Making
By Nharnet Team
Meskerem.com has lately taken an effort to initiate
discussion on the stillborn PFDJ constitution of 1997. Dr. Bereket Habte
Selassie, whom history will know as the main author, has come up to tell
about that document – and of course he is the right man to defend the
claimed virtues of that document. In so doing, Dr. Bereket started
hammering on the issue of public participation – participation of the
‘vast majority of the Eritrean people’. He stresses the “uniqueness of
the Eritrean model of constitution making”, and goes on to establish
“legitimacy” for the document while at the same time belittling and
casting suspicion on those “unreasonable” folks for rejecting the
document as “Isaias’ constitution” instead of accepting it as their
property. Dr. Bereket also believes, as many did in the past, that
Isaias and his PFDJ government “were committed to Democratic transition
and to constitutional government”.
At this moment in time, and to say the truth, Eritrea
appears to be suffering of lack of people knowledgeable in
constitutional matters – that is, save Dr. Bereket. Otherwise, they
could have come out to speak their heart about this document – a
document that could not see the light of the day for a decade because
those who were supposed to have been committed to democratic transition
were actually not committed. And until we obtain or discover other
Berekets (constitutional experts), we may be condemned to shut down and
only listen to what the erudite doctor lists as truths and logical
conclusions.
In the meantime, though, we can cite instances that
the doctor conveniently glosses over and ask questions on the meaning of
democratic participation, and how constitutions get their legitimacy.
What is democratic participation? How do legal drafts
become legitimate constitutions? Can democracy be exercised without
freedom of assembly, freedom of expression, the presence of free press,
civil societies, not to mention parties? Is “participation” measured by
a party holding massive meetings of the ‘entire nation’ in which the
feedback of the listeners is not that important? Were the concerns of
other Eritreans, other Eritrean political organizations, available civil
societies, and the wishes, fears and demands of marginalized nationality
groups, religious interests and language factors taken into serious
consideration when the Eritrean constitution was being drafted and then
deliberated upon by an unelected body?
Sometime in the mid-1980s, Ethiopia drafted a
constitution under Dictator Mengistu Hailemariam and asked people to
adopt it. In Eritrea, the announced result was that 85% of the Eritrean
voters said “yes” to the document. Was that, in its simplified way, what
they term “massive public participation”?
No one questions the goodness of modern way of
constitution-making that tries to involve the people at seminars and
give them the right to contribute in its making, to be aware of what it
is, and above all to feel that they “own the constitution”. But the big
question is: can participation of big throngs at seminars alone give
“legitimacy” to a constitution? Does the sheer size of gatherings in
seminars mean much when those seminar participants cannot have much
input in it?
Fortunately or unfortunately, the prevailing norm is
that it is the experts, the elite, who “know’ what to put in such
drafts. In a dictatorial setting like that of Eritrea under isaias, such
drafts become acceptable only when they get the blessing of those
standing on the drafters’ shoulders. And was it really true that Dr.
Bereket and his team in the Commission were given all the “autonomy” and
freedom to go their way by the same Isaias Afeworki? Dr. Bereket is
correct to say that everybody was enthusiastic and blindly euphoric in
newly independent Eritrea, including those who accepted whatever was
done in drafting the constitution. But, seeing things in retrospect, are
all those who were supportive of everything Isaias and his regime did at
that time still “enthusiastic” about all the things that went wrong,
including the constitution that was drafted in exclusion of so many
political and social forces and brazenly refused to accept fundamental
principles that can keep Eritreans united? Weren’t the flaws in the
draft constitution and the largely exclusionist process in its making
among the “lost opportunities” that Dr. Bereket and others mentioned in
their historic Berlin Manifesto? . We are told that when properly done,
constitution-making can facilitate national dialogue and help resolve
any potential conflict in divided societies. A senior British professor
on constitutional issues, Vivien Hart, concluded in a publication
entitled Distrust and Democracy that public participation in
constitution-making contributes in turning that document into public
"ownership" and assists in transforming a conflict situation to
sustainable democracy. The writer underscored that “the process of
making a constitution is often as important to its legitimacy and to the
creation of a culture of constitutionalism as is the actual text of the
document itself”.
According to Professor Hart, public participation is
a right of the entire people. But what kind of “public participation”?
The researcher puts it this way: “Genuine public participation requires
social inclusion, personal security, and freedom of speech and assembly.
A strong civil society, civic education, and good channels of
communication between all levels of society facilitate this process”.
Can we claim we had all this in the Eritrean constitution-making? We
wish we could.
Like most of the programmes of the Eritrean political
organizations, contents of constitutions are similar the world over. Let
alone a document prepared by Eritrean expert like Dr. Bereket, even the
two centuries’ old American constitution may have up to 70-80% relevant
in its content. We may take even the American constitution as a draft
document for a constitution let alone the 1952 Eritrean constitution or
the 1997 constitution that Dr. Bereket is talking about. If we are asked
to write a draft, may be over 90% of what we have in the PFDJ
constitution could be acceptable. But the point is about legitimacy and
genuine participation. The PFDJ regime is illegitimate. So are its
pronouncements. What genuine Eritreans should and are demanding is that
we give legitimacy to our future institutions starting with the draft
constitution of 1997 which is full of flaws and not legitimate yet.
There is no need for Dr. Bereket, and any other body for that matter, to
insult those who do not see legitimacy in the 1997 PFDJ constitution.
That is a bit too much, especially when it comes from an elderly
Eritrean – mayu zseteye Eritrawi - like Dr. Bereket.
When one says how the constitution is made matters,
one thinks of the basics of constitution-making: that it must be
deliberated and voted upon by a national parliament elected in a
democratic way. The PFDJ parliament that adopted the document consisted
of 150 members. Who were they? Were they representatives of the entire
nation elected in national and democratic suffrage? Can we say that the
75 members of the EPLF central council, who became by a decree members
of that assembly, nationally and democratically elected representatives
of the ‘entire people’? Were the other 75 members, many of them
handpicked, also “real representatives” elected in a democratic and free
atmosphere? Was that 1997 constitution really a “legitimate”
constitution?
We are informed that more than half of all the
existing constitutions in the world were written or rewritten after 1974
and that public participation was the norm in the debates that led to
their making. Therefore, there was nothing “unique” of what Eritrea did
in its constitution making, because seminars etc were prevalent in the
making of most of the modern-day constitutions. But something serious
was lacking in our case, the Eritrean case. For instance, while working
its new constitution, South Africa elected a parliament that acted as
the Constitutional Assembly. Rwanda elected a legislative assembly that
itself then elected a Constitutional Commission. All this and more
processes that lend legitimacy to a constitution were lacking in the
“unique” Eritrean situation.
To provide a reading material on constitutions and
constitution making, Nharnet.com shall post under this column a number
of articles on the subject. Today’s reading material reproduced below
was taken from the website of the United States Institute for Peace. The
article was written by the above mentioned Vivien Hart, a professor at
the University of Sussex, where she served as the director of the
University's Cunliffe Centre for the Study of Constitutionalism and
National Identity, an international research network involving scholars
and activists from the United Kingdom, Europe, United States, Canada,
South Africa, Sri Lanka, and Fiji. Good reading. Nharnet Team.
***
Democratic Constitution Making By Vivien Hart
Summary We live in an era of constitution making.
Writing a constitution is part of many peace processes. New nations and
radically new regimes that seek democratic credentials make writing a
constitution a priority. In a changing world, constitutional practice is
also changing. Twenty-first century constitutionalism is redefining the
long tradition of expert constitution making and bringing it into the
sphere of democratic participation.
How the constitution is made, as well as what it
says, matters. Process has become equally as important as the content of
the final document for the legitimacy of a new constitution.
A right to public participation in democratic
governance exists in international law. This right packs a moral punch
but it lacks legal teeth and effective enforcement. Does this right
extend from everyday governance to the process of constitution making?
The United Nations Committee on Human Rights has recognized a specific
right to participate in constitution making.
Public participation is often taken to mean
voting—for example, electing a constitutional convention or ratifying a
constitutional text by referendum. Especially in developing nations in
Africa and elsewhere, however, experiments with new forms of
participation are attempting to place initiative in the hands of
citizens and to create an open constitutional conversation in which the
public shares in agenda-setting, content, and ratification.
Genuine public participation requires social
inclusion, personal security, and freedom of speech and assembly. A
strong civil society, civic education, and good channels of
communication between all levels of society facilitate this process.
Only a considerable commitment of time and resources will make genuine
public participation possible.
A democratic constitution cannot be written for a
nation, nor can one be written in haste. "Interim" or "transitional"
constitutions that include guarantees for a continuing, open, and
inclusive process for the longer term offer one solution to urgent needs
for a framework of governance in new, divided, or war-torn nations.
Participatory constitution making is today a fact of
constitutional life as well as a good in itself. Despite challenging
difficulties of definition and implementation, a democratic
constitution-making process is, in the words of African observer Julius
Ivonhbere, "critical to the strength, acceptability, and legitimacy of
the final product."
Constitution Making: Tradition and Innovation We live
in an era of constitution making. Of close to 200 national constitutions
in existence today, more than half have been written or re-written in
the last quarter century. Constitution making has become a part of many
peace processes. New nations and radically new regimes, seeking the
democratic credentials that are often a condition for recognition by
other nations and by international political, financial, aid, and trade
organizations, make writing a constitution a priority. In many cases,
both the ways in which constitutions are written and the ideas of
sovereignty, citizenship, and rights that are embodied in these
foundational documents depart radically from the tradition epitomized by
the United States Constitution.
In 1787, the new United States of America was the
originator and model of traditional constitution making by a hand-picked
elite group, and of the constitution as marking a settlement of conflict
and inaugurating a new regime of powers and rights. Mainstream
scholarship has generally presented the American Constitution as the
fixed outcome of a period of nation building and constitution making.
Admirers, offering this as an example for others, tend to want to
duplicate its perceived virtues: constitution making as an "act of
completion," the constitution as a final settlement or social contract
in which basic political definitions, principles, and processes are
agreed, as is a commitment to abide by them.
Constitution makers today still confront the problem
posed by Alexander Hamilton in 1787, of whether "societies . . . are
really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection or
choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their
political constitutions on accident and force." The makers of "new"
constitutions do not seek to throw the entire tradition onto the scrap
heap. Constitutions remain higher law, specify the institutions of
governance, define the rights, duties, and relationships of state and
citizens, and set the tone or establish the identity of the
nation-state. Onto this traditional foundation, however, today's framers
seek to build new practices. Recent constitution-making processes have
been accompanied by massive efforts to involve the public before,
during, and after the text is finalized. Examples of new practice
include: prior agreement on broad principles as a first phase of
constitution making; an interim constitution to create space for longer
term democratic deliberation; civic education and media campaigns; the
creation and guarantee of channels of communication, right down to local
discussion forums; elections for constitution-making assemblies; open
drafting committees aspiring to transparency of decision making; and
approval by various combinations of representative legislatures, courts,
and referendums.
There is no simple transition to a new
constitutionalism. Control of the process and of the ultimate
distribution of power is at stake and participatory constitution making
remains highly controversial. Constitution making has not been made
easier, and by no means all of these innovations, nor of the
constitutions that result, have been successful. But the process does
move incrementally closer to the needs of the present day.
Constitution Making for the 21st Century Alexander
Hamilton's still-open question remains central to prospects for a
peaceful and democratic world. In the 21st century, proof of our
capacity for living together and sharing in good government is not only
ever more urgently needed but also requires—and is generating—creative
thinking about the making and content of present-day "political
constitutions." Constitutional experimentation in many new and newly
democratic nations challenges older constitutional democracies to
rethink their own practice and to engage in a process of mutual learning
about the contribution of constitution making to conflict transformation
and sustainable peace.
A nation confident in a stable future of internal
harmony and agreed purpose is not (if it ever was) the typical site of
constitution making today. A changed world calls the utility of the
traditional model of the constitution into question. Consider how high a
bar that traditional model of an act of completion sets to establishing
and legitimating constitutions in situations of conflict. Yet making a
traditional constitution is seen by many as essential to the
establishment of post-conflict governance by providing a framework to
manage diversity and ensure stability.
The late 20th century has seen nations, old and
young, that are deeply divided, often to the point of violence.
Nation-states, defined by established boundaries and the sole possession
of sovereignty, have been challenged from inside by claims for
self-determination or secession, and from without by the proliferation
of transnational political or economic treaties and powers with global
reach. At the same time, successful economic and social development have
been declared, as in the 1993 Vienna Declaration of the United Nations
that now frames development and human rights policy, to go hand in hand
with democratization. Meanwhile around the world many marginalized
groups—indigenous peoples; the poor; racial, ethnic, and language
identity groups; and, cutting across all social categories, women—have
demanded inclusion, political participation, and power sharing.
Conflicts over the identities, powers, and rights of
groups seem almost endemic, and, as such conflicts reproduce themselves
in the form of new identities and claims, are likely to be a permanent
feature of 21st century polities. The nature of many modern conflicts
makes a final resolution hard to reach. In such circumstances, finding a
way of living together within major disagreement is the more modest
goal. Traditional constitution making as a conclusion of conflict and
codification of a settlement that intends permanence and stability can
seem to threaten rather than reassure. Citizens who actively reject a
final act of closure seek instead assurances that constitution making
will not freeze the present distribution of power into place for the
long term, nor exclude the possibility of new participants and different
outcomes.
To imagine a constitutional settlement under which
diverse and disagreeing groups can live, while continuing to engage in a
freely accessible debate about that settlement itself, is a challenging
proposition. The tension between the security and stability offered by
the traditional ideal of constitutionalism and the flexibility called
for by new circumstances is what places process at the heart of the new
constitutionalism. A permanently open process must itself satisfy
qualitative standards that were previously applied only to the outcome
of constitution making. We used to think of a constitution as a
contract, negotiated by appropriate representatives, concluded, signed,
and observed. The constitution of new constitutionalism is, in contrast,
a conversation, conducted by all concerned, open to new entrants and
issues, seeking a workable formula that will be sustainable rather than
assuredly stable.
It is in such an environment of conversational
constitutionalism that the issue (startling to some traditionalists) of
a right to participate in making a constitution has arisen. The idea is
hotly contested by those who argue that only elites in modern societies
possess the moderation, technical expertise, negotiating skills, ability
to maintain confidentiality, and above all rational incentives to
compromise so as to maintain power that make for effective constitution
making. But it is hard to argue against democracy. The elite-made
constitution, according to the new paradigm, will lack the crucial
cultural element of legitimacy. It will do so because the process, not
just the final text, is seen as flawed.
A democratic constitution is no longer simply one
that establishes democratic governance. It is also a constitution that
is made in a democratic process. There is thus a moral claim to
participation, according to the norms of democracy. A claim of necessity
for participation is based on the belief that without the general sense
of "ownership" that comes from sharing authorship, today's public will
not understand, respect, support, and live within the constraints of
constitutional government. Whether there is also a legal right to
participate, for whom, and what all of this means in practical terms,
are also key issues for modern constitutionalism, whose reputation and
effectiveness depend upon democracy in its process as well as its
outcome. Experiments with public participation in the process of making
constitutions are a striking feature of "new constitutionalism." It is
with such issues of process that this report is concerned.
The Importance of Process How the constitution is
made, as well as what it says, matters. One of the most striking
innovations in the constitution-making practice of recent decades is
that norms of democratic procedure, transparency, and accountability
that are applied to daily political decision making are now also
demanded for constitutional deliberations. Is this window dressing with
democratic rhetoric, or can new ideas and practices make a difference? A
study in contrasts in North American constitutionalism illustrates the
radical changes in attitude to constitution making involved.
No one would expect an 18th century process to match
the standards of the 21st century. Nor would anyone describe the making
of the American Constitution in 1787 as a democratic exemplar for today.
Yet constitution making in the United States offers an important lesson.
Scholars have recently reflected on Article V of the U.S. Constitution,
the provision for constitutional amendment, as an admission by the
framers of the likely imperfection of the Constitution and a permission
to work within its frame to adjust its terms (see especially Sanford
Levinson's edited volume, Responding to Imperfection, published in
1995). Yet the limitations of the amending process are considerable. The
fact that the wishes and needs of indigenous peoples and African
Americans were originally considered irrelevant, and that those of women
were considered to be represented by men, left the American polity with
long-term problems. When newly assertive groups eventually demanded
recognition, finding solutions was hampered by the necessity of acting
within the constitutional framework, drafting amendments and litigation
according to a text set apart, a foundational document outside the
bounds of regular politics. The Constitution is subject to special and
especially difficult procedures for amendment and the language of
constitutional law is arcane. Thus even the first step for excluded
groups, entry to the constitutional debate, has never been easy. Gaining
each amendment or new interpretation has typically involved a
decades-long struggle for piecemeal reform.
Facing a similar upsurge of claims for constitutional
recognition, Canada has taken a significant step towards opening the
constitutional settlement to full democratic discussion. No less a body
than the Canadian Supreme Court has endorsed democratic process, in its
advice on the constitutional position of a potential act of secession by
the province of Quebec. The Court's 1998 decision regarding the
Reference re Secession of Quebec defined democracy as a core Canadian
constitutional principle. This meant, the court declared, "that a
functioning democracy required a continuous process of discussion." The
court noted further that "no one has a monopoly on truth," a fact
implying a duty to listen to "dissenting voices" and to seek "to
acknowledge and address those voices," even when the most basic unity of
the nation was at stake. The Canadian Constitution, the court concluded,
"gives expression to this principle [of democracy] by conferring a right
to initiate constitutional change on each participant" and imposing "a
corresponding duty . . . to engage in constitutional discussions in
order to acknowledge and address democratic expressions of a desire for
change." The Canadian Supreme Court decision is a summation of new
constitutionalism, of constitution making as a process rather than a
once-and-for-all defining moment, and of democratic re-negotiation as
the heart of a politics of recognition and inclusion. The Canadian
Constitution is defined as a forum for a historically continuous
discussion of the identity of the Canadian nation.
In other words, participatory constitution making has
become one criterion of a legitimate process. Where the premise of
constitutionalism as conversation is taken on board, constitution making
can no longer be confined exclusively to the domain of "high politics"
and negotiations among elites who draft texts behind closed doors. In
the context of a traditional constitution, presumed to stand above and
to structure democratic politics, the extension of democratic process to
include free, open, and responsive discussion of the constitutional
settlement itself represents a radical departure, but one that attempts
to overcome the problems of entry of new participants and of an equal
voice for all concerned regardless of their expertise
Participation by Right It is easy to say that public
participation in constitution making is desirable. But this remains a
matter of opinion and matters of opinion are hard to enforce. A right to
public participation in constitution making creates a stronger ground on
which to stand. Major international rights instruments and national
constitutions do grant a general right to democratic participation,
although one that is lacking legal teeth and effective enforcement.
However, the extension of the right to participate to constitution
making, breaching traditional assumptions that the constitution-making
process stands outside normal democratic activities, has been contested.
For a long time, even general democratic participation has been
considered at best to be an "emerging right," in the words of an
influential article on "The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance," by
international law professor Thomas M. Franck (published in the American
Journal of International Law for 1992). But the formal endorsement of
democracy does pack a moral punch and its diffusion in international
conventions and new national constitutions supports expectations that it
should be observed in constitution-making processes. And recent
developments have given participation in constitution making a textual
authority in international law that greatly strengthens its status.
These occur in a decision of the United Nations Committee on Human
Rights (UNCHR) acting in its judicial capacity, and in a General Comment
from the same source, both interpreting the right granted in the United
Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) as
extending to constitution making.
The right to participate in constitution making might
logically be derived from the general meaning of "democratic
participation" in the UN Declaration of Human Rights (1948, Article 21)
and especially Article 25 of the ICCPR (a covenant agreed in 1966 and
entered into force in 1976). Article 25 establishes a right to
participate in public affairs, to vote, and to have access to public
service: "Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity . . .
without unreasonable restrictions: (a) to take part in the conduct of
public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives; (b)
to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be
by universal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing
the free expression of the will of the electors; (c) to have access, on
general terms of equality, to public service in his country."
Later UN conventions and declarations against race
and gender discrimination and on the rights of minorities make similar
promises. Regional and transnational declarations such as the African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (1981, Article 13.1), the Asian
Charter of Rights (1998, Article 5.2), and the Inter-American Democratic
Charter (2001) all declare a general right to political participation to
be a fundamental principle.
As international lawyer Gregory H. Fox noted in a
volume edited with Brad R. Roth, Democratic Governance and International
Law (2000), at the start this "modest approach to democratization"
generally "focused on electoral processes." But successive documents and
judicial interpretations have gradually expanded the content of
participation itself, the arenas of participation, and the accompanying
penumbra of rights (including political equality, freedom of speech and
association, and rights to inclusion and equality) that genuine
participation presupposes. Along the way, the meaning of the ICCPR
phrase, "to take part in the conduct of public affairs," has
increasingly been explored to discover what those open-ended terms,
"take part" and "public affairs," might mean. In the course of this
process of definition, two documentary sources have joined the record
and now ground the international right to participate in constitution
making. Remarkably well-hidden in the body of UN political rights
doctrine; these can be described as both under-used to date, and also
ripe for development.
The first is a ruling in 1991 from the UNCHR, acting
in its judicial capacity to hear individual complaints under Optional
Protocol I to the ICCPR. Marshall v. Canada (Human Rights Committee,
CCPR/C/43/D/205/1986, 3 December 1991), a case brought in 1986 and
decided five years later, first authorized a specific right to
participate in constitution making as an undoubted part of public
affairs. Leaders of the Mikmaq tribal society made the claim against the
Canadian government that exclusion from direct participation in a series
of constitutional conferences "infringed their right to take part in the
conduct of public affairs, in violation of article 25(a) of the covenant
[the ICCPR]." The UNCHR ruled that: "At issue in the present case is
whether the constitutional conferences constituted a "conduct of public
affairs. . . [and] the committee cannot but conclude that they do indeed
constitute a conduct of public affairs"(italics added).
Winning only a pyrrhic victory, the Mikmaq people
learned that while there was indeed such a right to participate in
constitution making there had been no infringement in their case. Thus
the Mikmaq people's efforts, while gaining legal standing for the right
to participate in constitution making, also succeeded in establishing a
major limitation to the practical value of the legal right. The UNCHR
also ruled that: "It is for the legal and constitutional system of the
state party to provide for the modalities of such participation," and
"Article 25(a) of the covenant cannot be understood as meaning that any
directly affected group, large or small, has the unconditional right to
choose the modalities of participation in public affairs. That, in fact,
would be an extrapolation of the right to direct participation by the
citizens, far beyond the scope of Article 25(a)." Although the Mikmaq
leaders stated that their submissions through an intermediary body had
never even been laid on the table, the UNCHR found the Canadian
provisions for the representation of "approximately 600 aboriginal
groups" by "four national associations," and later by "a 'panel' of up
to 10 aboriginal leaders," adequate to meet the requirements of Article
25.
The second UNCHR textual authority is found in its
General Comment on Article 25 of the ICCPR, the right to participation,
issued on July 12, 1996. First, the key importance of Article 25's
general right to participation is underlined: "Whatever form of
constitution or government is in force, the covenant requires states . .
. to ensure that citizens have an effective opportunity to enjoy the
rights it protects. Article 25 lies at the core of democratic
government." The General Comment then declares decisively: "Citizens
also participate directly in the conduct of public affairs when they
choose or change their constitution" (italics added). Although the
prevailing opinion is that a General Comment is authoritative but not
binding in law, this unequivocal statement, coupled with the earlier
judicial precedent, undoubtedly does place participatory
constitutionalism on a newly secure footing.
Like Marshall v. Canada, the General Comment lacks
any specification of what a participatory constitution-making process
would look like. But unlike most of the international conventions that
preceded it, as well as the very limited notion of representation in
Marshall v. Canada, the General Comment does explicitly expand the scope
of democratic participation beyond the act of voting. Assemblies and
accountable representation, referenda and electoral decision making,
"public debate and dialogue," and citizens' "capacity to organize
themselves" are all identified as modes of participation. Thus the
support in international law for a right to participate in constitution
making is, inch by inch, gaining footing and expanding in scope. In the
meantime, the practice of participatory constitution making in many
parts of the world is running ahead of the international rulebook.
Practicing Participatory Constitutionalism Public
participation is often taken to mean voting, as for example electing a
constitutional convention or ratifying a constitutional text by a
referendum. As we saw earlier, Canada provided one early example of
groups from outside the closed circle demanding to join the constitution
making process. But especially in developing nations in Africa and
elsewhere, experiments with new structures and forms of participation
are attempting to develop an open process that places initiative in the
hands of citizens and creates a constitutional conversation. In many
cases, rather than working within the framework of an existing body of
procedures and precedents, these nations are starting with a clean
slate.
Canada's clean slate was the process of writing a new
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ratified in 1982. Canadian
constitutionalism since the 18th century had been shaped by conflict,
especially the search for reconciliation of francophone and anglophone
interests and for a status for Quebec that would recognize its
distinctive identity without giving it special privileges. In the early
1980s, women mobilized to insist that their interests be fully
represented. Canadian first nations also seized the moment to claim a
special status in Canadian governance. The constitutional conversation
had broadened and deepened long before the open-ended discussion of
diversity was endorsed as a principle by the Supreme Court. But we do
not need to look only to the older western liberal democracies for new
standards. The recent record of constitution making elsewhere abounds
with experiments in public participation.
Just a few examples suffice to illustrate the
widespread adoption of new and open processes. In 1986, the Nicaraguan
National Assembly invited comment on the draft of a new constitution.
Some 100,000 citizens took part in open town meetings, forwarding 4,300
suggestions. In 1988, constitution makers in Uganda and Brazil requested
suggestions before, as well as comment after, the drafting process, with
equally impressive levels of response. In 1994, the South African
Constitutional Assembly encouraged a nation of first-time voters to
participate in the constitution-making process with the slogan: "You've
made your mark, now have your say." Polls estimated that 73 percent of
South Africans were reached by the assembly's campaign. The public made
two million submissions. Between 1994 and 1997, Eritreans engaged in
constitutional education and consultation, addressing a nation with
markedly low literacy rates through songs, poems, stories, and plays in
vernacular languages, and using radio and mobile theatre to reach local
communities. In 2002, members of the Rwanda drafting commission and
thousands of trained assistants fanned out to spend six months in the
provinces, so that constitutional education and discussion could become
an integral part of community life. In 2003, the constitution review
process in Kenya is operating under a statutory requirement that Kenyans
have every opportunity to participate. The goal, as the Kenyan
Commission claimed, is "a people-driven review process whose final
product will be a people-owned constitution."
The South African Constitution of 1996 is widely
regarded as a model constitutional text. Likewise, the process by which
it was made has been hailed as a key part of the successful transition
from the oppression of apartheid to a democratic society. The following
features of the South African process illustrate the context and
challenges of democratic constitution making and set the context for
evaluating its general potential and problems.
In all, it took seven years, from 1989 to 1996, to
achieve the final constitution. Almost five years elapsed between the
first meeting of Nelson Mandela and Prime Minister P. W. Botha in 1989
and agreement on an interim constitution and the first non-racial
election in 1994. Throughout these years, outbreaks of violence
threatened the process.
In a key phase from 1990 to 1994, agreements on
process were negotiated in private and public sessions between former
adversaries. These included a 1990 agreement to negotiate about
constitutional negotiations; prolonged arguments from 1991 through 1992
about the form the constitution-making process should take; agreement in
April 1993 on procedures; and in December 1993 agreement on an interim
constitution including principles and procedures binding on the final
constitution-making process. In April 1994, the first non-racial
election for parliament was held with a voter turnout of about 86
percent. The following month, the new parliament met for the first time
as the Constitutional Assembly.
From 1994 through 1996 the South African process
became a full-scale demonstration of participatory constitution making.
Until that time, the public had had no direct role in constitution
making. Now their elected representatives in the assembly reached out to
educate them and invite their views. The educational effort included a
media and advertising campaign using newspapers, radio and television,
billboards, and the sides of buses; an assembly newspaper with a
circulation of 160,000; cartoons; a web site; and public meetings;
together these efforts reached an estimated 73 percent of the
population. From 1994 through 1996 the Constitutional Assembly received
two million submissions, from individuals and many advocacy groups,
professional associations, and other interests.
In the final phase from 1994 through 1996, in tandem
with the participatory campaign, committees of the assembly drafted a
new constitution within the parameters attached to the 1994 interim
constitution; a first working draft was published in November 1995,
leaving aside 68 issues for further work; a revised draft was produced
in April 1996; and a final text in May 1996. From July through September
1996 the Constitutional Court reviewed the text; the court then returned
the text to the assembly for amendments, which were made in October. In
November, the court gave its final certification and in December,
President Mandela signed the constitution into law.
The South African process took time. It was phased.
It benefited from an interim constitution that allowed the dialogue of
transition to continue. Participation was invited at a chosen moment
rather than throughout and then creativity and resources were committed
to facilitating a serious dialogue. Trust that the outcome would be
consistent with the 1994 democratic principles was created by the
continuation of the conversation between judicial certification and
parliamentary confirmation. As in Canada, groups including women and
traditional authorities found voice and access and made sure that their
interests were taken into account. Also important was the fact that
South Africa had a pre-existing civil society that could be drawn in as
a counterweight to the entrenched racial and partisan divisions of
politics. Other important factors that sustained the formal process
include patience, especially in the face of violence; a willingness by
all concerned to take some bold steps; and a combination of negotiation
in private over some of the most difficult issues and unprecedented
public involvement.
For comparison, let us look at the recent Rwandan
process, promised by the Arusha Peace Accord of 1999, with the main
phase of constitution making implemented in 2002 and completed by a
referendum in May 2003. The Action Plan of the Constitutional Commission
elected by the National Assembly required, in sequence, in its own
words:
The training and sensitization of the population
about the Constitution; The consultation of the population on the
content of the Constitution; The writing and validation of the draft
text of the Constitution; The referendum on the text of the Constitution
as approved by Parliament.
The budget for these activities ran to about US$7
million, the 12 commissioners spent six months participating in local
programs and debates, and in the final referendum almost 90 percent of
the electorate voted, with 93 percent of those voting approving the new
constitution. Notably, public participation was initiated even before a
constitutional text was drafted. Again, the process was carefully
staged, the commitment of time and resources was considerable, and
participation was not simply structured on existing party lines.
The Rwandan process, as too the current Kenyan
process, also suggests another characteristic of these creatively
participatory processes. Constitutional re-visioning comes into play
when the alternative is unsustainable or too dire to contemplate,
whether that be dictatorial oppression, violence, or genocide. A
democratic constitution-making process contributes to making peace
because the prerequisite of any livable alternative to the horrors many
nations have experienced is that all parties are willing to try to keep
talking about their disagreements. Using words that echo Alexander
Hamilton's, quoted above, philosopher Stuart Hampshire concluded in his
recent book, Justice Is Conflict (2000): "Because there will always be
conflicts between conceptions of the good, . . . there is everywhere a
well-recognized need for procedures of conflict resolution, which can
replace brute force and domination and tyranny." The quality of the
process as a means of conflict transformation lies in ensuring that all
who have views and grievances have an effective voice, that
participation is genuine and not a charade.
Constitution making is essentially about the
distribution of power. Unsurprisingly, the idealism of the innovations
described above must be tempered with realism about who is really in
charge. In both South Africa and Rwanda, political elites initiated the
process of constitutional change, provided the personnel for the key
institutions, and framed the educational campaigns. Official ambivalence
and continuing attempts to block the process in Kenya reveal how a
participatory process initiated from perceived political necessity can
threaten an elite with loss of control and incur their resistance. At
the most cynical extreme, a determined elite or one that is confident of
its continuing control may offer a participatory process as a charade, a
democratic hoax intended to mollify unrest by granting the appearance of
democracy without its substance. The achievements of participatory
constitution making, then, are not to be romanticized.
Zimbabwe's recent experience provides a cautionary
tale. In 1997 civil society groups and the political opposition formed
an umbrella organization that pressed for a constitution-making process
and insisted that this be conducted on participatory lines. In 1999,
President Robert Mugabe reluctantly established a commission that was
instructed to produce a draft constitution with the fullest public
consultation. On paper, the official Observer Mission of the Center for
Democracy and Development (CDD, a London- and Lagos- based
non-governmental organization) reported a model process: public
hearings, an outreach program of town hall meetings and other community
activities, a multilingual media campaign, scientific polling, an
international conference. Their report (The Zimbabwe Constitutional
Referendum, published in 2000) estimates that "the commission received
about 7000 written submissions, held more than 4000 meetings nationwide
and interacted directly in public meetings with more than half a million
people." But behind the formal facts lay a manipulative process. The
appointed commission was controlled by the president's party; only 13
percent were women. Bitter partisan disputes, intimidation, and violence
erupted. The commission's draft constitution was sent to President
Mugabe without any opportunity for further public comment. He quickly
forwarded it for a referendum vote without possibility of amendment. In
February 2000, the electorate rejected the draft constitution by 54 to
46 percent.
Immediately after the vote Lewis Machipisa
editorialized in Africa News that this "'no' vote is also a 'no' vote
against the arrogance that we experienced from the government. They
didn't treat us as people who mattered." A survey reported by Masipula
Sithole and Charles Mangongera in the journal Agenda in March 2001 found
that 43 percent of "no" voters believed that "most people rejected the
draft constitution because it did not fully take into account the
expressed wishes of the people." As the CDD concluded, "a flawed process
could only produce a flawed product." The process, CDD reported, was
stacked, lacked transparency, was short on education and on translations
from English, was rushed (taking a mere 10 months all told), and
ultimately lacked credibility. The only recourse for frustrated
Zimbabweans was the negative one of voting down the entire document.
Women Making Constitutions One further characteristic
of the practice of participatory constitution making is visible in many
of these accounts, yet has received little concerted comment. The
pressure to resolve conflict through constitutional conversation has
often come from long-term disagreements, conflicts, and wars over some
combination of racial, ethnic, and territorial boundaries. Where
participatory constitution making has offered a forum for reconciling
division and redressing grievances, it has often also provided an
opportunity for women to gain representation in process and outcome.
Indeed, women have at times been instrumental in demanding such a
constitutional opening, where governance or social conditions have
previously made free entry difficult or silenced their voices.
In Nicaragua in 1986 women's effectiveness was a
matter of comment by seasoned observer Andrew Reding. He reported in his
article "By the People," published in Christianity and Crisis: "The
women stunned everyone. Hundreds of them took turns denouncing the
language of the first constitutional draft. This in spite of the fact
that the draft was already strong on women's rights." Ugandan women
mobilized to participate in the 10-year constitution-making process; the
constitution that came into force in 1996 was described by Oliver Furley
and James Katalikawe (in African Affairs for 1997) as outstanding in
"the degree to which it attempts to promote and protect the rights of
women." In 1992–93, Cambodia, in a constitution-making process assisted
by the United Nations as a way forward from a violent past, provided one
of many examples of women's important role in newly open processes.
Women comprised 63 percent of the Cambodian population, and, Stephen P.
Marks reported in a paper prepared in 2003 for the U.S. Institute of
Peace project on Constitution Making, Peacebuilding, and National
Reconciliation, a women's movement emerged that demanded a role in
making Cambodia's new constitution: "During a four-day National Women's
Summit, . . . 109 women from eight provinces spoke out on this issue.
One of the organizers . . . said, 'We want to participate at all levels
of policymaking, including drafting the new constitution.' " Thus South
African women had precedents to follow when they called for (and won) a
presence on the crucial drafting committees there, strong guarantees of
gender equality, and protections against discrimination. In Rwanda as in
Cambodia, in the wake of destructive civil war, women again comprised a
large majority of the population. Three of the twelve commissioners in
Rwanda were women, as were seven of twenty-nine Constitution Review
commissioners in Kenya.
Participatory constitution making is by definition
inclusive. Yet in few nations do women, in the words of the ICCPR, "take
part in the conduct of public affairs" on an equal basis with men. Women
are usually demographically a majority, the more so in some
post-conflict nations where the loss of male lives or the flight of
males has grossly skewed the ratio. As democratization and development
have become linked in international programs, women's education, social
contribution, and political participation have been identified as
important to success. The institutionalization of an international
women's movement and opportunities for networking and sharing experience
through events such as the United Nations' World Conferences on Women
have provided motivation and support to women to seek out the formative
moment of constitution making in order to ensure gender fairness in any
new regime. Furthermore, women's presence across all party lines and
demographic categories sometimes enables them to unite, or to resolve
disputes across otherwise sharp dividing lines, as the Northern Ireland
Women's Coalition is credited with having done on several occasions in
the negotiation for and implementation of the Belfast Agreement of 1998.
Women are not primarily responsible for the
initiation of participatory practices, whose origins are multiple—in
human rights debates, in democratization movements, in anti-colonial
movements structured on democratic lines, and other places. Women may,
however, both particularly benefit from constitutional change, with its
opportunities for inclusion, and support and encourage the expansion of
participatory methods. Fiona Mackay and others, in a forthcoming essay
(in Women Making Constitutions, edited by Alexandra Dobrowolsky and
Vivien Hart, October 2003) offer evidence that women in politics on the
whole display "a more outward looking and collective orientation," and
will emphasize "establishing a dialogue based on evidence and prior
preparation." We may learn from such evidence that women bring attitudes
and experience highly appropriate to democratic constitution making and
that their increasing participation will give impetus and depth to
developing practice.
Lessons for the Constitution-Making Process At its
best, participatory constitutionalism works and counteracts the
arguments in support of elite negotiation as the sole effective mode. At
its worst, as in Zimbabwe, it provides only another guise for the
exercise of raw power. In Zimbabwe, the public saw through the hoax and
responded by negating the process with a "no" vote in the referendum of
2000. For vulnerable citizens to have some recourse other than such a
negative response, however, internal contextual factors including a
strong civil society or external factors such as an international right
and/or an international enforcement mechanism are means of empowerment.
Genuine public participation requires social inclusion, personal
security, and freedom of speech and assembly. A strong civil society,
civic education, and good channels of communication between all levels
of society further facilitate the process.
Only a considerable commitment of time and resources
makes genuine public participation possible. Even if we count South
Africa's starting point as the moment of agreement in 1991 to negotiate
the process, constitution making in that highly successful case took at
least five years. Many would argue that the process was underway at
least two years before that, from the moment leaders began tentative
approaches across the racial divide; clearly, part of the process is the
building of an adequate level of trust between elites and among the
general public to enable a constitutional conversation to take place at
all.
Modes of participation vary considerably—there is no
one model appropriate to all nations. South Africa elected a parliament
that acted as the Constitutional Assembly. Rwanda elected a legislative
assembly that itself then elected a Constitutional Commission. Both
nations sought out public opinion through a variety of channels, used
media imaginatively, and devised materials to make constitutional issues
accessible in multiple languages to their populations regardless of
levels of literacy.
The public were not involved equally at all stages of
the South African and other processes. While South Africans could follow
the progress of public negotiations up to 1994, some absolutely critical
deadlocks along the way were resolved in secret meetings. The entire
public was first invited to take part in the 1994 election, the most
conventional form of participation. But in the South African context,
where most of the population had previously been excluded on racial
grounds, this was a momentous act. Approximately 86 percent of the
population voted. The number of voters, as well as the number of
submissions to the Constitutional Assembly, confirm that the public will
participate where they see the issues and outcomes as important.
Literacy and language are only two of the factors that have operated to
exclude groups and individuals from constitution making in the past.
Participatory processes have worked to overcome these two factors as
well as racial and ethnic exclusions and have been notable in some
nations for the new participation of indigenous peoples and in most
cases for the very visible inclusion of women.
About the Report This report examines the role of
constitution making as part of peacemaking, particularly in divided
societies, where the process of participatory constitution making may
sometimes provide a forum for reconciling divisions, negotiating
conflict, and redressing grievances. The report analyzes recent
practices of constitution making across the globe and documents the
emergence of international human rights norms that recognize the right
to public participation in changing or creating a constitution. The
author concludes with a reflection on lessons learned and stresses the
importance of process as well as outcome in evaluating the final
product. |